PRC Court: Unauthorized Great Firewall Circumvention Services are Illegal Hacking Tools

According to a Henan court, during the summer of 2016, a man named Liu Bingyang started selling a VPN service based on software called "Shadowsocks" to people in China. The court found that Shadowsocks allowed users to "illegally access overseas websites, receive and view illegal videos, and receive and listen to illegal broadcasts." The court did not convict Liu of operating an unlicensed business or illegally operating a telecommunication service. Instead the Court sentenced Liu to three years imprisonment for violating Clause 3 of Article 285 of China's Criminal Law which provides:

Any person who provides programs or instruments used specially for penetrating into or illegally controlling computer information systems, or knowingly provides programs or instruments to another person for committing illegal or criminal acts of penetrating into or illegally controlling computer information systems shall, if the circumstances are serious, be punished in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

The Court rejected Liu's defense that the service he provided only circumvented network monitoring programs, and that the services did not actually hack into or take control over any computer or server, and were not able to hack into the security of any computer information services.

The Court's judgement (original available on PRC Court website  here, translated below) made several references to "the monitoring of nation's Internet firewall" and "climbing the wall."

Criminal Judgment in the First Instance Trial of Liu Bingyang

People's Court of Xinye County, Henan Province

Criminal Judgment Document

(2017)Yu 1239 Criminal First No. 556

Public Prosecutorial Agency is the People's Procuratorate of Xinye County

Defendant Liu Bingyang, male, born April 13, 2993 in Xinye County, Henan Province, Han ethnicity, high school education, farmer, residing in Xinye County. Criminally detained by the Xinye County Public Security Bureau on March 30, 2016, and released on bail on April 1 of the same year. Bail was rescinded on October 13, 2017 following a decision by this Court. Currently at home.

Defense attorney Hai Fan of the Henan Sun Xiao Wei Law Firm.

On October 13, 2017 the People's Procuratorate of Xinye County filed an indictment with this Court pursuant to Public Indictment Document (2017) No. 324 charing the defendant Liu Bingyang with committing the crime of providing programs and tools to penetrate into and illegally control computer information systems. This Court accept the case on the same day, and formed a collegiate panel in accordance with the law, and convened public hearings in court. The People's Procuratorate of Xinye County assigned Procutorator Ma Shuhua to appear in court in support of the indictment, and the defendant Liu Bingyang and his defense attorney Hai Fan appeared in court to participate in the proceedings. Hearings have now concluded.

The Xinye County Public Procuratorate charged that during the summer of 2016, defendant Liu Bingyang utilized various websites including Ali Cloud, VULTR, RFCHOST, 50KVM, and SSCLOUD and used Alipay and Paypal to purchase and create proxy servers overseas and sold Great Firewall circumvention services to third parties. Defendant Liu Binyang used his a website of his own construction XX to distribute information about Shadowsocks software and download links, with users making payments to defendant Lin Bingyang through third party platforms such as Wechat and Alipay, Paypal, and UKOI. After users made purchases they could freely access foreign websites and videos. By the time this case was discovered, defendant Liu Bingyang had purchased and created a total of 55 overseas proxy servers, developed a total of 4,091 customers, and illegally obtained profits of 342,635 yuan (based on a conversion of rate of 6.90 yuan to the US dollar and 0.89 yuan to the Hong Kong dollar).

It has been determined that the "Shadowsocks" software and the services which the defendant illegally sold could circumvent the monitoring of our country's Internet firewall, and illegally access overseas websites, receive and view illegal videos, and receive and listen to illegal broadcasts.

The public prosecutorial agency provided evidence to this Court to prove the foregoing facts in the indictment. The public prosecutorial agency believes that defendant Liu Bingyang violated state regulations and provided programs for penetrating into  and illegally controlling computer information systems, that the circumstances are severe, and that his actions constitute the crime of providing programs and tools to penetrating into and illegally controlling computer information systems, and requests that he be punished in accordance with the law.

Defendant Liu Bingyang did not object to the crime charged in the indictment, but offered the defense that the software was downloaded from the Internet, and that all he was providing was a VPN network proxy service, and that the illegal gains included costs, and the purchase costs were 30-40,000 yuan.

Defendant Liu Bingyang's defense attorney maintains that the network service penetration that defendant Liu Bingyang provided was with respect to network monitoring programs, and that he did not intrude into or take control over any computer or server and was not able to penetrate into the security of computer information services, so his actions did not constitute the crime of providing programs and tools for penetrating and illegally controlling computer information systems. Further he actively cooperated with agencies in this case and exposed other criminals.

Based on hearings and investigations it has been ascertained that during the summer of 2016, defendant Liu Bingyang utilized various websites including Ali Cloud, VULTR, RFCHOST, 50KVM, and SSCLOUD and used Alipay and Paypal to purchase and create proxy servers overseas and sold Great Firewall circumvention [lit. "wall climbing"] services to third parties. Defendant Liu Binyang used his a website of his own construction XX to distribute information about shadowsocks software and download links, with users making payments to defendant Lin Bingyang through third party platforms such as Wechat and Alipay, paypal, and UKOI. After users made purchases they could freely access foreign websites and videos. By the time this case was discovered, defendant Liu Bingyang had purchased and created a total of 55 overseas proxy servers, developed a total of 4,091 customers, and illegally obtained profits of 342,635 yuan (based on a conversion of rate of 6.90 yuan to the US dollar and 0.89 yuan to the Hong Kong dollar).

It has been determined that the "Shadowsocks" software and services which the defendant illegally sold could circumvent the monitoring of our nation's Internet firewall, and illegally access overseas websites, receive and view illegal videos, and receive and listen to illegal broadcasts.

It has been further determined that on April 1, 2017, defendant Liu Bingyang handed over 230,000 yuan in illegal gains to the public security bureau, and on November 6, 2017 defendant Liu Bingyang handed over 70,000 yuan in illegal gains to the public security bureau.

Neither defendant Liu Bingyang nor his defense attorney Hai Fan contested any of the foregoing facts during the court hearing process, and the veracity of said facts are sufficiently confirmed by evidence such as defendant Liu Bingyang's deposition, the testimony of witnesses Jin Xin, Li Mou 1, Wang Mou 1, Wang Mou 2, Li Mou 2, Gao Mou, Gu Mou, Wang Mou, Zhang Mou, Liu Mou, Wang Mou 3, Tian Mou, and others, a review of bank card customer transactions, a review of Alipay Zhifubao, cell phones, laptop computers, Alipay Zhifubao receipts, lists of seized and returned items, as well as in-court appearances and proofs of residency.

This Court finds that defendant Liu Bingyang violated state rules and provided programs for the intrusion and illegal control of computer information systems, that the circumstance are severe, and that his behavior constitutes the crime of providing programs and tools for the intrusion into and illegal control of computer information services, and shall be punished in accordance with the law.

An examination of the defenses proffered by defendant Liu Bingyang and his defense attorney shows that the services provided by defendant Liu Bingyang had not been authorized by the relevant government agencies, avoided or penetrated computer system security defense measures, circumvented the monitoring of our country's Internet firewall, illegally accessed overseas websites, viewed illegal videos, and listened to illegal broadcasts. This Court therefore does not accept the defense proffered by defendant Liu Bingyang and his defense attorney that the defendant's actions did not constitute the crime of providing programs and tools for the intrusion into and illegal control of computer information services.

There is documentation showing that defendant Liu Bingyang wrote exculpatory materials after answering the summons, but no government agency has any proof, and there is no evidence proving, the defense attorney's contention that the defendant has helped expose the crimes of other criminals. This court therefore does not accept it.

After answering the summons defendant Lin Bingyang was candid about his criminal activity, and proactively handed over his illegal gains, in court his attitude in admitting guild was relatively good, and these factors have all been taken into consideration during sentencing. 

In order to strike at crime and safeguard the security of computer information systems, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 285(3), 67(3), 72(1)(3), 73(2)(3), 52, 53, and 64 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, it is the judgment of this Court that:

1. Defendant Liu Bingyang provided  programs and tools for the intrusion into and illegal control of computer information services, and is sentenced to three years imprisonment, suspended for five years, and fined 10,000 yuan. (Suspended sentence probation period to commence from the day this judgment is confirmed. Fine to be paid within three days after this judgment becomes effective.)

2. Illegal gains of 300,000 yuan to be confiscated and turned over to the state treasury.

If he does not accept this judgment he may submit an appeal to this court or directly to the Nanyang Intermediate People's Court within 10 days after the day after receiving this judgment. Written appeals should be submitted with one original and five copies.

Presiding Judge: Lu Qingwei
Judge: Zhao Qin
People's Assessor: Bao Hanju

November 9, 2017

Clerk: Liu Haizhou

刘冰洋一审刑事判决书

  

河南省新野县人民法院

刑 事 判 决 书

（2017）豫1329刑初556号

公诉机关新野县人民检察院。
被告人刘冰洋，男，1993年4月13日出生于河南省新野县，汉族，高中文化，农民，住新野县。因涉嫌犯非法经营罪于2016年3月30日被新野县公安局刑事拘留，同年4月1日转取保候审。经本院决定于2017年10月13日被取保候审。现在家。

辩护人海凡，河南孙晓伟律师事务所律师。

新野县人民检察院被以新检公诉刑诉（2017）324号起诉书指控被告人刘冰洋犯提供侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统程序、工具罪，于2017年10月13日向本院提起公诉。本院于同日立案，并依法组成合议庭，公开开庭审理了本案。新野县人民检察院指派检察员马书华出庭支持公诉，被告人刘冰洋及其辩护人海凡均到庭参加诉讼。现已审理终结。

新野县人民检察院指控，2016年夏，被告人刘冰洋通过互联网在阿里云、VULTR、RFCHOST、50KVM、SSCLOUD等网站，用支付宝和PAYPAL购买并搭建境外代理服务器向他人售卖翻墙代理服务。被告人刘冰洋利用自己建设的网站××发布shadowsocks软件信息及下载链接，用户购买时通过微信和支付宝、paypal、UKOI第三方平台向被告人刘冰洋付款，用户购买后可以自由查看境外网站和视频。截至案发，被告人刘冰洋共购买、搭建境外代理服务器55个，发展客户共计4091个，非法获利342635元（其中，美元汇率按6.90元、港币汇率按0.89元折算）。

经认定，被告人非法出售的“Shadowsocks”软件及服务，可以绕开我国互联网防火墙的监管，非法访问境外互联网站，收看非法电视、收听非法广播。

对指控的以上事实，公诉机关向本院提交了相应的证据予以证实。
公诉机关认为，被告人刘冰洋违反国家规定，提供侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统的程序，情节特别严重，其行为已构成提供侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统程序、工具罪，提请依法惩处。

被告人刘冰洋对起诉书指控的罪名均无异议，辩称软件是网上下载的，自己仅提供VPN网络代理服务，非法获利的数额还有成本在内，购买成本约三、四万元。

被告人刘冰洋的辩护人辩护认为，被告人刘冰洋提供的网络服务侵犯的是网络监管秩序，没有侵入或控制任何一台计算机及服务器，不能侵犯计算机信息系统的安全，其行为不构成提供侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统程序、工具罪；另外其积极配合办案机关，揭发其他犯罪分子。

经审理查明，2016年夏，被告人刘冰洋通过互联网在阿里云、VULTR、RFCHOST、50KVM、SSCLOUD等网站，用支付宝和PAYPAL购买并搭建境外代理服务器向他人售卖翻墙代理服务。被告人刘冰洋利用自己建设的网站××发布shadowsocks软件信息及下载链接，用户购买时通过微信和支付宝、paypal、UKOI第三方平台向被告人刘冰洋付款，用户购买后可以自由查看境外网站和视频。截至案发，被告人刘冰洋共购买、搭建境外代理服务器55个，发展客户共计4091个，非法获利30余万元（其中，美元汇率按6.90元、港币汇率按0.89元折算）。

经认定，被告人非法出售的“Shadowsocks”软件及服务，可以绕开我国互联网防火墙的监管，非法访问境外互联网站，收看非法电视、收听非法广播。

另查明，2017年4月1日，被告人刘冰洋向公安机关缴纳非法所得230000元，2017年11月6日被告人刘冰洋缴纳非法所得70000元。

上述事实，被告人刘冰洋及其辩护人海凡在开庭审理过程中均无异议，并有被告人刘冰洋的供述，证人金鑫、李某1、王某1、王某2、李某2、高某、贾某、汪某、张某、刘某、王某3、田某同等人的证言，银行卡客户交易查询、支付宝查询、手机、笔记本、支付宝截图、扣押、发还清单、到案经过及户籍证明等证据予以证实，足以认定。

本院认为，被告人刘冰洋违反国家规定，提供侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统的程序，情节特别严重，其行为已构成提供侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统程序、工具罪，依法应当受到惩罚。新野县人民检察院的指控成立，依法予以支持。被告人刘冰洋的辩护人的辩护意见，经查，被告人刘冰洋提供的服务，未经相关部门授权，具有避开或者突破计算机信息系统安全保护措施，绕开我国互联网防火墙的监管，非法访问境外互联网站，收看非法电视、收听非法广播，故对被告人刘冰洋辩护人辩护认为被告人行为不构成提供侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统程序、工具罪的辩护意见依法不予采信；在卷显示被告人刘冰洋到案后书写了揭发材料，但任何机关均未出具任何证明，无证据证实，故对辩护人认为被告人具有揭发其他犯罪分子的辩护意见依法不予采信。被告人刘冰洋到案后坦白犯罪事实，积极退缴违法所得，庭审中认罪态度较好，在量刑时均酌情予以考虑。为了打击犯罪，维护计算机信息系统的安全，依照《中华人民共和国刑法》第二百八十五条第三款、第六十七条第三款、第七十二条第一、三款、第七十三条二、三款、第五十二条、第五十三条、第六十四条之规定，判决如下：

一、被告人刘冰洋犯提供侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统程序、工具罪，判处有期徒刑三年，缓刑五年，并处罚金100000元。
（缓刑考验期自判决确定之日起计算。罚金限判决生效后三日内缴清。）

二、违法所得30万元予以没收，由收缴单位上缴国库。
如不服本判决，可在接到判决书的第二日起十日内，通过本院或直接向河南省南阳市中级人民法院提出上诉。书面上诉的，应当提交上诉状正本一份，副本五份。

审　判　长　　芦清伟
审　判　员　　赵　钦
人民陪审员　　鲍汉举

二〇一七年十一月九日

书　记　员　　刘海洲

Related Provisions from the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China

Article 285.   Whoever violates state regulations and penetrate into computer systems with information concerning state affairs, construction of defense facilities, and sophisticated science and technology is be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention.

Any person who, in violation of State regulations, penetrates into computer information systems other than the systems prescribed in the preceding paragraph, or uses other technological means to obtain data stored in, or processed or transmitted by that computer information system, or conducts illegal control of that computer information system shall, if the circumstances are serious, be sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and be concurrently imposed with a fine, or shall be imposed with a fine alone; if the circumstances are especially serious, such person shall be sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years and be concurrently imposed with a fine.

Any person who provides programs or instruments used specially for penetrating into or illegally controlling computer information systems, or knowingly provides programs or instruments to another person for committing illegal or criminal acts of intruding into or illegally controlling computer information systems shall, if the circumstances are serious, be punished in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

Article 286.   Whoever violates states regulations and deletes, alters, adds, and interferes in computer information systems, causing abnormal operations of the systems and grave consequences, is to be sentenced to not more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention; when the consequences are particularly serious, the sentence is to be not less than five years of fixed-term imprisonment.

Whoever violates state regulations and deletes, alters, or adds the data or application programs installed in or processed and transmitted by the computer systems, and causes grave consequences, is to be punished according to the preceding paragraph.

Whoever deliberately creates and propagates computer virus and other programs which sabotage the normal operation of the computer system and cause grave consequences is to be punished according to the first paragraph.

第二百八十五条　【非法侵入计算机信息系统罪；非法获取计算机信息系统数据、非法控制计算机信息系统罪；提供侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统程序、工具罪】违反国家规定，侵入国家事务、国防建设、尖端科学技术领域的计算机信息系统的，处三年以下有期徒刑或者拘役。

违反国家规定，侵入前款规定以外的计算机信息系统或者采用其他技术手段，获取该计算机信息系统中存储、处理或者传输的数据，或者对该计算机信息系统实施非法控制，情节严重的，处三年以下有期徒刑或者拘役，并处或者单处罚金；情节特别严重的，处三年以上七年以下有期徒刑，并处罚金。
　　
提供专门用于侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统的程序、工具，或者明知他人实施侵入、非法控制计算机信息系统的违法犯罪行为而为其提供程序、工具，情节严重的，依照前款的规定处罚。

第二百八十六条　【破坏计算机信息系统罪】违反国家规定，对计算机信息系统功能进行删除、修改、增加、干扰，造成计算机信息系统不能正常运行，后果严重的，处五年以下有期徒刑或者拘役；后果特别严重的，处五年以上有期徒刑。

违反国家规定，对计算机信息系统中存储、处理或者传输的数据和应用程序进行删除、修改、增加的操作，后果严重的，依照前款的规定处罚。
　　
故意制作、传播计算机病毒等破坏性程序，影响计算机系统正常运行，后果严重的，依照第一款的规定处罚。

Translation: Rules Regarding the Adjudication of Civil Disputes Involving the Utilization of Information Networks to Infringe Upon Personal Rights and Interests

Rules Regarding the Adjudication of Civil Disputes Involving the Utilization of Information Networks to Infringe Upon Personal Rights and Interests

(Judicial Interpretation No. 11 [2014], Adopted at the 1,621 meeting of the Supreme People's Court Adjudication Committee on June 23, 2014)

The "Rules Regarding the Adjudication of Civil Disputes Involving the Utilization of Information Networks to Infringe Upon Personal Rights and Interests" were adopted at the 1,621 meeting of the Supreme People's Court Adjudication Committee on June 23, 2014 and are hereby promulgated and shall become effective from October 10, 2014.

Supreme People's Court

These Rules are hereby formulated in accordance with the "Civil Law," "Tort Law," "National People's Congress Standing Committee Decision Regarding Strengthening the Protection of Network Information," "Civil Procedure Law," and other laws and regulations to correctly adjudicate civil disputes involving the utilization of information networks to infringe personal rights and interests and unify trial practice.

Article 1. As used in these Rules, civil disputes involving the utilization of information networks to infringe personal rights and interests refers to disputes arising out of the utilization of information networks to infringe the rights of personhood including rights of name, reputation, honor, image, and privacy.

Article 2. People's Courts where the infringing action took place or where the defendant resides shall have jurisdiction over lawsuits arising out of the utilization of information networks to infringe personal rights and interests.

The place where the infringing action took place shall include the location of the computer or other terminal equipment used by the defendant to carry out the infringing behavior. The location where the infringing behavior's outcome occurs shall include the residence of the infringed upon party.

Article 3. People's Courts shall accept cases where the plaintiff brings an action against an Internet user or an Internet service provider under Clauses 2 and 3 of the Article 36 of the Tort Law.

If a plaintiff only sues an Internet user, and the Internet user requests that an Internet service provider suspected of infringment be added as a co-defendant or third party, the People's Court shall allow it.

If a plaintiff only sues an Internet service provider, and the Internet service provider requests that a verifiable Internet user be added as a co-defendant or third party, the People's Court shall allow it.

Article 4. When a plaintiff sues an Internet service provider, and the Internet service provider offers the defense that allegedly infringing information was published by an Internet user, the People's Court may, in accordance with the particular circumstances of the plaintiff's request and the case, order the Internet service provider to provide the People's Court the name (alias), contact information, IP address, and other information of any verifiable Internet user suspected of infringement.

If an Internet service provider does not provide the information without justifiable reason, the People's Court may impose fines or similar measures on the Internet service provider in accordance with Article 114 of the Civil Procedure Law.

If a plaintiff requests to add an Internet user as a defendant based on the information provided by an Internet service provider, the People's Court shall allow it.

Article 5. In accordance with Clause 2 of Article 6 of the Tort Law, if an infringed party issues a notice including the following information to an Internet service provider either in writing or by a means publicized by an Internet service provider, the People's Court shall deem it effective:

1. Notifying party's name (alias) and contact information; and
2. The Internet address with respect to which measures must be taken or information sufficient to determine the infringing content; and
3. Relevant information regarding the reason the notifying party is demanding deletion.

If an infringed party's notice does not satisfy the foregoing conditions and an Internet service provider maintains that it is exempt from liability, the People's Court shall rule in favor of the Internet service provider.

Article 6. When determining whether an Internet service provider adopted measures to delete, block, or delink in a timely manner, a People's Court shall make an overall judgment based on such factors as the nature of the Internet services, the manner and degree of precision of an effective notice, and the type and degree of harm to rights by the Internet information.

Article 7. If an Internet user claims that an Internet service provider should be held liable for breach of contract when the latter has taken measures to delete, block, or delink information they had published, and the Internet service provider offers the defense of having received a notification, the People's Court shall rule in favor of the Internet service provider.

If an Internet user whose content has been the object of measures such as deletion, blockage, or delinking requests that the Internet service provider disclose the content of the notice, the People's Court shall support the request.

Article 8. Where a notice issuer's notice causes an Internet service provider to adopt measures to delete, block, or sever links in error, and the Internet user who was the object of the measures requests the notifying party bear responsibility for infringement, the People's Court shall support their request.

Where the Internet user who was the object of the measures requests the Internet service provider to take restoration measures, the People's Court shall support this request, except where technical limitations render restoration impossible.

Article 9. People's Courts shall consider the following factors when determining whether or not an Internet service provider had "knowledge" under Article 36, Clause 3 of the Tort Law:

(i) Whether the Internet service provider recommended, ranked, selected, edited, modified, revised, or otherwise processed the infringing online information using human or automatic means.
(ii) Whether the administrative functionality the Internet service provider should have implemented, as well as the nature of its service and the manner in which it was provided, increased or decreased the likelihood of infringement.
(iii) The type and degree of obviousness of the personal rights and interests the online information infringes.
(iv) The degree of social impact or the browsing volume in a given time frame of the online information.
(v)  The possibility that the Internet service provider could have adopted measures to prevent infringement and whether reasonable measures were adopted.
(vi) Whether the Internet service provider adopted reasonable measures with respect to repeated infringements by the same Internet user or the same infringing information.
(vii) Other factors relevant to the case.

Article 10. People's Courts shall consider the following factors when determining the existence and degree of fault for republication of online information by an Internet user or Internet service provider:

(i) the duty of care that the republishing party bears relative to their nature and degree of influence;
(ii) the degree of obviousness that the republished online information would infringe upon the personal rights of third parties;
(iii) whether the republished information was materially revised or whether the title of the article was added revised in such a way as to make it likely that readers would be severely misled with respect to its content.

Article 11. Where a business operator requests that an Internet user or Internet service provider bear tort liability because an Internet user or Internet service provider has engaged in libel or other forms of defamation that damages the public's trust in a business operator or decreases the public's valuation of its products or services, the People's Court shall support their request in accordance with the law.

Article 12. Where an infringed party requests that an Internet user or Internet service provider bear tort liability for using the Internet to publicize an individual's genetic information, medical history data, health examination data, criminal record, home address, personal life or other personal private or individual information resulting in harm to said party, the People's Court shall support the request except in the following circumstances:

(i) the individual has consented in writing to the disclosure and its scope;
(ii) the disclosure and its scope are in the public interest;
(iii) the disclosure is made public interest institutions such as schools and scientific research bodies with the written consent of the individual and the method of publication does not allow the identification of specific individuals;
(iv) information made available online by the individual themselves or other personal information that is made public legally;
(v) personal information obtained through legal channels;
(vi) where otherwise provided by laws or administrative regulations.

Where a rights holder requests that an Internet user or Internet service provider bear tort liability for either publicizing information set forth in Clauses 4 or 5 above in a manner that is contrary to the public interest or social mores, or publicizing information that infringes upon an individual's important interest that is worthy of protection, the People's Court shall support their request.

This clause shall not be applied to state agencies that publicize personal information pursuant to the exercise of their official powers.

Article 13. Where an Internet user or Internet service provider publishes information, the origin of which is a document produced by a government agency as part of its official duties or the official actions conducted in public, with the result being an infringement of the personal rights of an individual, the People's Court shall support the request of the infringed party that the infringing party bear tort liability if one of the following circumstances exists:

(i) the information published by the Internet user or the Internet service provider is not consistent with the original information;
(ii) the Internet user or Internet service provider adds insulting content, defamatory information, in appropriate titles, or use the addition or removal of information, alteration of the structure, or changing the order to lead people to misunderstand;
(iii) the information from whence the aforementioned information originated was publicly corrected, but the Internet user refuses to provide an update or the Internet service provider does not allow updating;
(iv) the information from whence the aforementioned information originated was publicly corrected, but the Internet user still publishes the pre-correction information.

Article 14. People's Courts shall hold invalid any agreement between an infringed upon party and an Internet user or an Internet service provider whereby one party agrees to pay compensation and the other party agrees to provide deletion, blocking, or de-linking services.

Where someone unilaterally distorts, deletes, or blocks specific online information or uses de-linking to prevent others from obtaining online information, and the Internet user or Internet service provider that published the information requests that the infringer bear tort liability, the People's Court shall support their request. Where someone acts as an agent to carry out the foregoing behavior, the agent and the principal shall bear joint liability.

Article 15. People's Courts shall support a request from an infringed party that anyone employing, organizing, abetting, or assisting others to publish or republish online information that infringes upon the personal rights of others bear joint liability.

Article 16. Where a People's Court rules that an infringing party shall undertake formal steps to make a formal apology, take counteractive measures, or restore someone's reputation, it shall correspond to the scope of the impact of the specific infringement. Where an infringing party refuses to carry it out, the People's Court may undertake reasonable measures to execute the ruling including publishing notices online and publishing the judgment document, and the fees arising therefrom shall be borne by the infringing party.

Article 17. Where an Internet user or Internet service provider infringes upon the personal rights and interests of another resulting in property damage or severe mental anguish, and the infringed requests they bear liability in accordance with the provisions of Article 20 and Article 22 of the Tort Law, the People's Court shall support their request.

Article 18. The reasonable expenses incurred by an infringed party in the course of curbing infringing activity may be deemed to be property loss under Article 20 of the Tort Law. Reasonable expenses shall include reasonable fees incurred by the infringed party or their agents in conducting investigations of infringing behavior and obtaining evidence. People's Courts may, on the basis of a request from the infringed party and the specific circumstances of the case, also include lawyer fees in the compensation calculation, provided they conform to the rules set by relevant state agencies.

If it is not possible to determine the amount of property loss suffered by an infringed party or the amount of illegal benefit obtained by the infringing party, the People's Court may, in accordance with the specific circumstances of the case, award a compensation amount of 500,000 yuan or less.

The amount of compensation for mental anguish shall be determined in accordance with Article 10 of the Supreme People's Court Explanation Regarding Certain Questions Relating to Determining Compensation Liability for in Civil Tort Cases Involving Mental Anguish."

Article 19. Following their implementation these Rules shall be utilized by the People's Courts in the adjudication of all first and second instance trials.

These Rules shall not be applied in cases where a final judgment has been rendered prior to their implementation, or where a party files a request for a retrial or a decision is issued pursuant to post-judgment supervision procedures after their implementation.

最高人民法院关于审理利用信息网络侵害人身权益民事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的规定

http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2014/08/id/147944.shtml

（法释〔2014〕11号，2014年6月23日最高人民法院审判委员会第1621次会议通过）

《最高人民法院关于审理利用信息网络侵害人身权益民事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的规定》已于2014年6月23日由最高人民法院审判委员会第1621次会议通过，现予公布，自2014年10月10日起施行。

最高人民法院

2014年8月21日

为正确审理利用信息网络侵害人身权益民事纠纷案件，根据《中华人民共和国民法通则》《中华人民共和国侵权责任法》《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强网络信息保护的决定》《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》等法律的规定，结合审判实践，制定本规定。

第一条 本规定所称的利用信息网络侵害人身权益民事纠纷案件，是指利用信息网络侵害他人姓名权、名称权、名誉权、荣誉权、肖像权、隐私权等人身权益引起的纠纷案件。

第二条 利用信息网络侵害人身权益提起的诉讼，由侵权行为地或者被告住所地人民法院管辖。

侵权行为实施地包括实施被诉侵权行为的计算机等终端设备所在地，侵权结果发生地包括被侵权人住所地。

第三条 原告依据侵权责任法第三十六条第二款、第三款的规定起诉网络用户或者网络服务提供者的，人民法院应予受理。

原告仅起诉网络用户，网络用户请求追加涉嫌侵权的网络服务提供者为共同被告或者第三人的，人民法院应予准许。

原告仅起诉网络服务提供者，网络服务提供者请求追加可以确定的网络用户为共同被告或者第三人的，人民法院应予准许。

第四条 原告起诉网络服务提供者，网络服务提供者以涉嫌侵权的信息系网络用户发布为由抗辩的，人民法院可以根据原告的请求及案件的具体情况，责令网络服务提供者向人民法院提供能够确定涉嫌侵权的网络用户的姓名（名称）、联系方式、网络地址等信息。

网络服务提供者无正当理由拒不提供的，人民法院可以依据民事诉讼法第一百一十四条的规定对网络服务提供者采取处罚等措施。

原告根据网络服务提供者提供的信息请求追加网络用户为被告的，人民法院应予准许。

第五条 依据侵权责任法第三十六条第二款的规定，被侵权人以书面形式或者网络服务提供者公示的方式向网络服务提供者发出的通知，包含下列内容的，人民法院应当认定有效：

（一）通知人的姓名（名称）和联系方式；

（二）要求采取必要措施的网络地址或者足以准确定位侵权内容的相关信息；

（三）通知人要求删除相关信息的理由。

被侵权人发送的通知未满足上述条件，网络服务提供者主张免除责任的，人民法院应予支持。

第六条 人民法院适用侵权责任法第三十六条第二款的规定，认定网络服务提供者采取的删除、屏蔽、断开链接等必要措施是否及时，应当根据网络服务的性质、有效通知的形式和准确程度，网络信息侵害权益的类型和程度等因素综合判断。

第七条 其发布的信息被采取删除、屏蔽、断开链接等措施的网络用户，主张网络服务提供者承担违约责任或者侵权责任，网络服务提供者以收到通知为由抗辩的，人民法院应予支持。

被采取删除、屏蔽、断开链接等措施的网络用户，请求网络服务提供者提供通知内容的，人民法院应予支持。

第八条 因通知人的通知导致网络服务提供者错误采取删除、屏蔽、断开链接等措施，被采取措施的网络用户请求通知人承担侵权责任的，人民法院应予支持。

被错误采取措施的网络用户请求网络服务提供者采取相应恢复措施的，人民法院应予支持，但受技术条件限制无法恢复的除外。

第九条 人民法院依据侵权责任法第三十六条第三款认定网络服务提供者是否“知道”，应当综合考虑下列因素：

（一）网络服务提供者是否以人工或者自动方式对侵权网络信息以推荐、排名、选择、编辑、整理、修改等方式作出处理；

（二）网络服务提供者应当具备的管理信息的能力，以及所提供服务的性质、方式及其引发侵权的可能性大小；

（三）该网络信息侵害人身权益的类型及明显程度；

（四）该网络信息的社会影响程度或者一定时间内的浏览量；

（五）网络服务提供者采取预防侵权措施的技术可能性及其是否采取了相应的合理措施；

（六）网络服务提供者是否针对同一网络用户的重复侵权行为或者同一侵权信息采取了相应的合理措施；

（七）与本案相关的其他因素。

第十条 人民法院认定网络用户或者网络服务提供者转载网络信息行为的过错及其程度，应当综合以下因素：

（一）转载主体所承担的与其性质、影响范围相适应的注意义务；

（二）所转载信息侵害他人人身权益的明显程度；

（三）对所转载信息是否作出实质性修改，是否添加或者修改文章标题，导致其与内容严重不符以及误导公众的可能性。

第十一条 网络用户或者网络服务提供者采取诽谤、诋毁等手段，损害公众对经营主体的信赖，降低其产品或者服务的社会评价，经营主体请求网络用户或者网络服务提供者承担侵权责任的，人民法院应依法予以支持。

第十二条 网络用户或者网络服务提供者利用网络公开自然人基因信息、病历资料、健康检查资料、犯罪记录、家庭住址、私人活动等个人隐私和其他个人信息，造成他人损害，被侵权人请求其承担侵权责任的，人民法院应予支持。但下列情形除外：

（一）经自然人书面同意且在约定范围内公开；

（二）为促进社会公共利益且在必要范围内；

（三）学校、科研机构等基于公共利益为学术研究或者统计的目的，经自然人书面同意，且公开的方式不足以识别特定自然人；

（四）自然人自行在网络上公开的信息或者其他已合法公开的个人信息；

（五）以合法渠道获取的个人信息；

（六）法律或者行政法规另有规定。

网络用户或者网络服务提供者以违反社会公共利益、社会公德的方式公开前款第四项、第五项规定的个人信息，或者公开该信息侵害权利人值得保护的重大利益，权利人请求网络用户或者网络服务提供者承担侵权责任的，人民法院应予支持。

国家机关行使职权公开个人信息的，不适用本条规定。

第十三条 网络用户或者网络服务提供者，根据国家机关依职权制作的文书和公开实施的职权行为等信息来源所发布的信息，有下列情形之一，侵害他人人身权益，被侵权人请求侵权人承担侵权责任的，人民法院应予支持：

（一）网络用户或者网络服务提供者发布的信息与前述信息来源内容不符；

（二）网络用户或者网络服务提供者以添加侮辱性内容、诽谤性信息、不当标题或者通过增删信息、调整结构、改变顺序等方式致人误解；

（三）前述信息来源已被公开更正，但网络用户拒绝更正或者网络服务提供者不予更正；

（四）前述信息来源已被公开更正，网络用户或者网络服务提供者仍然发布更正之前的信息。

第十四条 被侵权人与构成侵权的网络用户或者网络服务提供者达成一方支付报酬，另一方提供删除、屏蔽、断开链接等服务的协议，人民法院应认定为无效。

擅自篡改、删除、屏蔽特定网络信息或者以断开链接的方式阻止他人获取网络信息，发布该信息的网络用户或者网络服务提供者请求侵权人承担侵权责任的，人民法院应予支持。接受他人委托实施该行为的，委托人与受托人承担连带责任。

第十五条 雇佣、组织、教唆或者帮助他人发布、转发网络信息侵害他人人身权益，被侵权人请求行为人承担连带责任的，人民法院应予支持。

第十六条 人民法院判决侵权人承担赔礼道歉、消除影响或者恢复名誉等责任形式的，应当与侵权的具体方式和所造成的影响范围相当。侵权人拒不履行的，人民法院可以采取在网络上发布公告或者公布裁判文书等合理的方式执行，由此产生的费用由侵权人承担。

第十七条 网络用户或者网络服务提供者侵害他人人身权益，造成财产损失或者严重精神损害，被侵权人依据侵权责任法第二十条和第二十二条的规定请求其承担赔偿责任的，人民法院应予支持。

第十八条 被侵权人为制止侵权行为所支付的合理开支，可以认定为侵权责任法第二十条规定的财产损失。合理开支包括被侵权人或者委托代理人对侵权行为进行调查、取证的合理费用。人民法院根据当事人的请求和具体案情，可以将符合国家有关部门规定的律师费用计算在赔偿范围内。

被侵权人因人身权益受侵害造成的财产损失或者侵权人因此获得的利益无法确定的，人民法院可以根据具体案情在50万元以下的范围内确定赔偿数额。

精神损害的赔偿数额，依据《最高人民法院关于确定民事侵权精神损害赔偿责任若干问题的解释》第十条的规定予以确定。

第十九条 本规定施行后人民法院正在审理的一审、二审案件适用本规定。

本规定施行前已经终审，本规定施行后当事人申请再审或者按照审判监督程序决定再审的案件，不适用本规定。

Translation: Decision Regarding Strengthening Network Information Protection

National People's Congress Standing Committee Decision Regarding Strengthening Network Information Protection

(Passed at the 30th Meeting of the 11th Plenum of the National People's Congress Standing Committee on December 28, 2012)

In order to protect Internet information security, ensure the legal rights and interests of citizens, legal persons, and other groups, and safeguard national security and the public interest, it is hereby decided as follows:

1. The State protects electronic information that can distinguish a citizens' personal identity and that relates to citizens' personal privacy.

An organization and individual may neither steal or obtain through illegal means citizens' personal electronic information, nor sell or illegally provide to a third party citizens' personal electronic information.

2. Network service providers and other enterprises that collect or utilize citizens' personal electronic information in the course of business activities shall abide by the principles of legality, legitimacy, and necessity, clearly explain the purpose, manner, and scope of collection, and shall not, without the approval of the individual whose information is being collected, collect or use information in a manner that violates the provisions of laws and regulations, and the agreements of both parties.

Network information providers and other enterprises that collect or utilize citizens' personal electronic information shall publicize their rules for collection and utilization.

3. Network service providers and other enterprises and their employees must strictly preserve the confidentiality of citizens' personal electronic information collected during the course of business activities, and may not disclose, falsify, or damage it, and may not sell or illegally provide it to third parties.

4. Network service providers and other enterprises shall adopt technical and other necessary measures, ensure information security, and prevent the disclosure, damage, or loss of citizens' personal electronic information collected during the course of business activities. Remedial measures shall be immediately taken when information has or may have been disclosed, damaged, or lost.

5. Network service providers shall strengthen their management of information issued by their users, and upon discovering the issuance or transmission of information prohibited by law or regulation it shall immediately cease transmission of said information, and adopt measures to dispose of it, such as removing it, retain relevant records, and report it to the relevant agency.

6. When entering into agreements or confirming the provision of services with users, network service providers who provide users network connection services, conduct network access procedures for fixed and mobile telephones, or who provide users with information issuing services shall require users to provide truthful identity information.

7. No organization or individual may send commercial electronic information to a fixed line or mobile telephone or an individual's email address if it has not obtained  the approval of, or a request from, the electronic information recipient, or if the electronic information recipient has clearly expressed its refusal.

8. Citizens who discover network information that discloses an individual's identity, disseminates an individual's private affairs, or otherwise infringes upon their legal rights and interests, or who is harassed by receiving commercial electronic information, has the right to require the network service provider to delete the relevant information or adopt other necessary measures to stop it.

9. Every organization and individual has the right to file a complaint or accusation to the relevant responsible agency regarding any criminal activity relating to the provision of citizens' personal electronic information to a third party through theft or its acquisition or sale through illegal means or other network information illegal criminal activity. Upon receipt of a complaint or accusation, the agency shall handle it promptly in accordance with law. A person whose rights have been infringed may file a lawsuit in accordance with the law.

10. Relevant responsible agencies shall perform their responsibilities within the scope of their statutory authority in accordance with the law, and shall adopt technical and  other necessary measure to prevent, stop, investigate and prosecute the illegal provision of citizens' personal electronic information to a third party through theft or its acquisition or sale through illegal means or other network information illegal criminal activity. Network service providers shall provide cooperation and technical support to relevant responsible agencies in the course of their performing their responsibilities in accordance with the law.

State agencies and their staff shall maintain the confidentiality of citizens' personal electronic information that they learn during the course of fulfilling their duties, and shall not disclose, falsify, or damage it, and shall not sell or illegally provide it to third parties.

11. Activities that violate this Decision shall result in sanctions including warnings, fines, confiscation of illegal gains, revocation of license or cancellation of registration, closure of website, banning of relevant responsible employees from operating network service businesses, and shall be logged in social credit registries and publicized. Activities that constitute violations of public security administration shall be subject to public security administration sanctions in accordance with the law. Where a crime has been committed, criminal responsibility shall be pursued in accordance with the law. Those who infringe upon citizens' civil rights and interests shall bear civil responsibility in accordance with the law.

12. This Decision shall become effective on the day it is publicized.

全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强网络信息保护的决定

(2012年12月28日第十一届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第三十次会议通过)

为了保护网络信息安全，保障公民、法人和其他组织的合法权益，维护国家安全和社会公共利益，特作如下决定：

一、国家保护能够识别公民个人身份和涉及公民个人隐私的电子信息。

任何组织和个人不得窃取或者以其他非法方式获取公民个人电子信息，不得出售或者非法向他人提供公民个人电子信息。

二、网络服务提供者和其他企业事业单位在业务活动中收集、使用公民个人电子信息，应当遵循合法、正当、必要的原则，明示收集、使用信息的目的、方式和范围，并经被收集者同意，不得违反法律、法规的规定和双方的约定收集、使用信息。

网络服务提供者和其他企业事业单位收集、使用公民个人电子信息，应当公开其收集、使用规则。

三、网络服务提供者和其他企业事业单位及其工作人员对在业务活动中收集的公民个人电子信息必须严格保密，不得泄露、篡改、毁损，不得出售或者非法向他人提供。

四、网络服务提供者和其他企业事业单位应当采取技术措施和其他必要措施，确保信息安全，防止在业务活动中收集的公民个人电子信息泄露、毁损、丢失。在发生或者可能发生信息泄露、毁损、丢失的情况时，应当立即采取补救措施。

五、网络服务提供者应当加强对其用户发布的信息的管理，发现法律、法规禁止发布或者传输的信息的，应当立即停止传输该信息，采取消除等处置措施，保存有关记录，并向有关主管部门报告。

六、网络服务提供者为用户办理网站接入服务，办理固定电话、移动电话等入网手续，或者为用户提供信息发布服务，应当在与用户签订协议或者确认提供服务时，要求用户提供真实身份信息。

七、任何组织和个人未经电子信息接收者同意或者请求，或者电子信息接收者明确表示拒绝的，不得向其固定电话、移动电话或者个人电子邮箱发送商业性电子信息。

八、公民发现泄露个人身份、散布个人隐私等侵害其合法权益的网络信息，或者受到商业性电子信息侵扰的，有权要求网络服务提供者删除有关信息或者采取其他必要措施予以制止。

九、任何组织和个人对窃取或者以其他非法方式获取、出售或者非法向他人提供公民个人电子信息的违法犯罪行为以及其他网络信息违法犯罪行为，有权向有关主管部门举报、控告；接到举报、控告的部门应当依法及时处理。被侵权人可以依法提起诉讼。

十、有关主管部门应当在各自职权范围内依法履行职责，采取技术措施和其他必要措施，防范、制止和查处窃取或者以其他非法方式获取、出售或者非法向他人提供公民个人电子信息的违法犯罪行为以及其他网络信息违法犯罪行为。有关主管部门依法履行职责时，网络服务提供者应当予以配合，提供技术支持。

国家机关及其工作人员对在履行职责中知悉的公民个人电子信息应当予以保密，不得泄露、篡改、毁损，不得出售或者非法向他人提供。

十一、对有违反本决定行为的，依法给予警告、罚款、没收违法所得、吊销许可证或者取消备案、关闭网站、禁止有关责任人员从事网络服务业务等处罚，记入社会信用档案并予以公布；构成违反治安管理行为的，依法给予治安管理处罚。构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。侵害他人民事权益的，依法承担民事责任。

十二、本决定自公布之日起施行。

When It Comes to Real Name Registration, State Media Editorial Says Readers Should Ignore South Korean Court's Declaration That Such Systems Violate Right to Free Speech

Beginning in late 2011, Beijing and other large municipalities in China began issuing regulations requiring micro-blogging platforms such as Sina's Weibo to verify users' identities. For example, on December 16, 2011 the Beijing Municipal Government Information Office, Public Security Bureau, Communications Administration, and Internet Information Office jointly issued the "Certain Provisions on the Administration of Micro-Blog Development" stating:

Any organization or individual that registers a micro-blog account and produces, reproduces, publishes, or disseminates information content shall use real identity information, and shall not carry out registration by falsifying or replicating a resident's identity information, business registration information, or organization code information. 

Websites that launch micro-blog services shall ensure that the authenticity of registered user information under the preceding paragraph.

According to an article entitled "Weibo Regulations a Step on the Right Path" published in the state-sponsored Global Times the day after Beijing issued the Provisions:

The new regulations, in theory, are pertinent to solving weibo's urgent problems without harming its good effects. South Korea has already ordered real-name registration for the Internet.

On December 22, the state-sponsored China Daily also sought to reassure readers that this was "Common Practice":

China is not the only country to resort to real-name registration to monitor the Internet. The government of the Republic of Korea started to implement a real-name authentication system on its major websites in 2007 to prevent Internet violence, fraud or malicious information spreading.

In 2009, the system was expanded to cover all websites with daily visits of over 100,000.

On August 23, 2012, the Constitutional Court of South Korea issued its decision in the application of Sohn et. al. unanimously holding that Korea's Internet real name systems were unconstitutional because "they infringe upon freedom of expression and autonomous control of personal data."

On August 24, 2012, the official state news agency Xinhua and the state-sponsored China Daily  published an editorial entitled "No Need to Be Overly Concerned About Korea Abolishing Its Real Name System" (不必对韩国取消实名制过分惊诧) by Wu Dingping (吴定平). An excerpt:

Korea's Constitutional Court recently officially declared that the Internet real name law that had been in effect since 2007 was henceforth abolished. Korea was one of the first countries to promote an Internet real name system, so does abolishing it after five years of implementation indicate that problems exist with the Internet real name systems? Should China continue with its implementation?
. . . .
On the one hand, at the time Korea originally implemented its Internet real name system, it did in fact provide a positive example for China to learn from, and even acted as our reference model. On the other hand, China's implementation of an Internet real name system was not mechanical mimicry, nor was it simply "copying." Therefore, the fact that today Korea has eliminated its Internet real name system does not mean that China should do so tomorrow. These two have no definite logical relationship. 

Why did Korea's love affair with its real name system come to an end? Fundamentally, there were no actual problems with the real name system, rather the main issue was that Korea had insufficient protections for personal privacy, and this led to significant pressure on, and resistance to, the real name system, and led ultimately to a fatal attack on it. Comparatively speaking, China has done a better job in this area. 

韩国宪法法院近日正式宣布，废除2007年生效的网络实名制法案。韩国是世界上较早推行网络实名制的国家，在实行五年之后宣布废除，这是否代表网络实名制存在问题？我国还要不要继续推行？广大网民对此比较关心。
. . . .
对于这个问题，应本着实事求是的原则。一方面韩国当初推行网络实名制，的确为我国提供了有益的借鉴，甚至还是我们参照的一个样本；但另一方面我国推行实名制不是对韩国的机械效仿，更不是简单“拷贝复制”。因此，韩国取消实名制的今天并不就是我国实名制的明天，两者之间不存在必然的逻辑关系。 

韩国实名制为何“始乱终弃”、半途而废？本质而言不是实名制本身存在问题，而主要是缘于韩国在个人隐私保护方面做得不够到位，给实名制带来巨大的压力和阻力，最终产生致命性的打击。相比较而言，我国在这方面做得相对较好。

The editorial went on to discuss what the author says are China's extensive legislative protections for user privacy which "serve as 'escort vessels' for the smooth implementation of the real name system." (为实名制的顺利推行起到“保驾护航”的作用)

Whether or not China's real name system will avoid the security concerns that plagued Korea's implementation, the fact is the editorial's premise is false: the South Korean Constitutional Court explicitly said it was NOT going to rule on the privacy issue. The Court's decision stated:

Applicant Sohn et al. further assert that the mandatory verification of user identity restricts bulletin board user’s right to privacy as it obliges the user to disclose the personal data such as name,resident’s registration number, etc. However, we have already explained that the mandatory verification of user identity restricts user’s right to autonomous control of personal data, which is a concrete manifestation of the right to privacy. As we shall decide whether the restriction of user’s right to autonomous control of personal data amounts to infringement, there is no need for us to rule upon the alleged infringement of the right to privacy.

Instead, the Court said that "the focal issues of this case are whether the restrictions imposed by the mandatory verification of user identity are disproportionate and excessive."

Ultimately, the Court found as follows:

We find that the mandatory verification of user identity stipulated in the provisions under review operates as prior restriction of freedom of expression. It discourages expression in general and thus restrains constitutionally protected speech and it hampers free formation of public opinion which is at the heart of democracy. The provisions under review impose excessive restrictions and infringe upon freedom of expression and autonomous control of personal data of Applicant Sohn et al. and upon freedom of press, etc. of Applicant Company.

An English translation of the Korean Court's decision by Professor Keechang Kim, Korea University Law School is available here: http://openweb.or.kr/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Korean-Constitutional-Court-declares-real-name-verification-unconstitutional.pdf

Certain Provisions on the Regulation of Internet Information Service Market Order

Article 1. In order to regulate Internet information service market order, safeguard the provision of Internet information services and users' legal rights and interests, and promote the healthy development of the Internet industry, these provisions are hereby formulated in accordance with the provisions of the "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," the "Measures on the Administration of Internet Information Services," and other laws and administrative regulations and provisions.

Article 2. Anyone who engages in Internet information services or activities relating to Internet information services in the People's Republic of China shall obey these provisions.

Article 3. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the communication administrations of the provinces, autonomous regions, and metropolitan areas (hereinafter referred to as "Telecommunication Administration Agencies") shall oversee and administer Internet information service activity in accordance with the law.

Article 4. Internet information service providers shall provide services on the principles of equality, voluntariness, fairness, and credibility.