Showing posts with label Caixin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Caixin. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 12, 2022

Covid-19 Series: Censored Essay on Covid Strategies for China

Between April 9 and 11, 2022, an article titled "Epidemic Prevention Strategies to Minimize Loss of Life"  (生命损失最小化的防疫策略) by Liang Jianzhang (梁建章) was deleted from the following PRC-based news outlets: Caixin, Phoenix, and Sina:

 Caixin: https://web.archive.org/web/20220408071721/https://opinion.caixin.com/2022-04-08/101867209.html

 Phoenix: https://web.archive.org/web/20220409165217/https://news.ifeng.com/c/8F45EVlqK1j

Sina: https://k.sina.com.cn/article_1946109133_73ff44cd01900xqcp.html

Liang originally posted the article on his Tencent Weixin account on April 8, 2022 at https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/LdaMgSMrY2YcqZ5w3jaIhA. As of April 11, however, that essay had been replaced with a notice reading: "Upon Receipt of Relevant Complaints, This Content Violates the 'Administrative Provisions on Internet User Public Account Information Services'" (接相关投诉,此内容违反《互联网用户公众账号信息服务管理规定》). The original post is archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20220409095426/https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/LdaMgSMrY2YcqZ5w3jaIhA 

According to Wikipedia, Liang earned his bachelor's and a master's degree in computer science from the Georgia Institute of Technology. In 2011, he earned a PhD in Economics from Stanford University. He is a co-author of the book "Too Many People in China?," which analyzed the impact of the one-child policy and the adverse effects of demographic changes on China's economy, and a 2018 book, "The Demographics of Innovation."

Below is a machine translation of Liang's censored essay.

Epidemic Prevention Strategies to Minimize Loss of Life

2022-04-08 10:36

It has been more than two years in the fight against the epidemic. Under the guidance of the concept of life comes first, the government resolutely implemented policies such as the lockdown of Wuhan in the early stages of the epidemic, which reduced the number of infections and deaths to a minimum in a short period of time, and achieved world-renowned epidemic prevention achievements. But two years later, the virus has evolved from Alpha to Omicron. Compared with the previous strains, on the one hand, the virus has reduced toxicity and the mortality rate has dropped significantly; on the other hand, the transmissibility has been greatly enhanced, which makes our "anti-infection strategy" more expensive. This essay analyzes how to balance the benefits and costs through the impact of different epidemic prevention strategies on life expectancy, and then chooses the strategy with the least loss of life.

Two Anti-Epidemic Strategies

Infection prevention strategy: Quarantine policies are the mainstay, which includes a large number of nucleic acid tests and epidemiological investigations, as well as the closure and control of localities or even entire municipalities. The purpose is to block the infection chain and eliminate the infection to the greatest extent possible.

Death prevention strategy: Focus medical resources on treating seriously ill patients. For high mortality groups such as the elderly, vaccination is strengthened, and effective specific drugs are introduced to minimize the number of deaths.

Model diagram of epidemic prevention strategy:



The above diagram shows the logic of the model. For strains with high mortality and strong transmissibility, the anti-infection strategy is better, because the cost of infection prevention is low and the benefits are high. Conversely. For strains with low mortality and weak infectivity, the strategy of preventing death is better.

From the above model, it can be seen that the key to the selection of the best strategy is to quantitatively analyze and compare the extra cost and life loss of the "anti-infection strategy" relative to the "anti-death strategy."

1) Life loss due to infection prevention strategy = loss of life expectancy due to economic loss of isolation and containment.

This loss rises with the spread of the virus.

2) Life loss from death prevention strategies = loss of life expectancy due to death from infection.

This gain decreases as the virulence of the virus decreases.

The relationship between GDP per capita and average life expectancy

We can analyze the relationship between average life expectancy and per capita GDP by studying the historical data of various countries. It is an obvious fact: the higher the per capita income of a country, the longer its life expectancy. Because rich countries are more able and willing to invest in health care, infrastructure and environmental governance, thereby reducing mortality and increasing life expectancy.

Figure 1 Relationship between per capita GDP (USD) and average life expectancy in some countries in 2019


Source: World Bank

Note: The abscissa has been logged, and the actual per capita GDP value is marked after the name of some countries

It can be seen that the per capita income is halved, and the average life expectancy is reduced by 1-3 years; China's per capita GDP in 2010 was about 45% of that in 2020, and the life expectancy was reduced by 2.5 years.

Figure 2 The relationship between per capita GDP and average life expectancy in China's provinces



 

Source: World Bank, National Bureau of Statistics

Note: The abscissa has been processed by log, and the graph also shows the historical data of China and the corresponding per capita GDP

From the above figure, we can also see the relationship between per capita GDP and average life expectancy in various regions of China. The richer the province, the longer the life expectancy. In modern peacetime, there have indeed been periods (if infrequently) of sharp declines in per capita income, such as when the Soviet Union collapsed, during 1991-1993, per capita income fell by 20% and life expectancy fell by four years. So in the face of a 50% change in income, even a very conservative estimate will lead to a one-year reduction in per capita income. To put it into perspective, for every 1% decrease in per capita GDP, life expectancy will decrease by about 5 days.

Statistical Life Value

We can also test this hypothesis through the theory of Value of Statistical life in economics. In the field of economics, "statistical life value" is a relatively mature concept, which refers to how much a society is willing to spend to reduce mortality. Some people may be disgusted by this concept, thinking that there is no need to calculate the value of life, because life is supposed to be priceless. From an ethical standpoint alone, the above point of view is certainly not wrong. However, in the actual operation process, regardless of work life, business operation or social management, a balance must be pursued between reducing the risk of death and input cost. As for how to find this balance, it is necessary to calculate the "statistical life value" scientifically and rationally.

For example, companies and governments also need to balance risk and cost when providing various means of transportation and transportation infrastructure. For example, when the government designs a road, if it builds more lanes, or sets up special non-motorized lanes, or wider sidewalks, etc., it is possible to reduce the fatality rate of traffic accidents. But obviously not all roads have such a setup. Does this mean that the designer disregarded the safety of life? it's not true. As a designer, if a seemingly absolutely safe road costs 10 billion to build regardless of the cost, it is very likely that this road cannot be built at all, leaving ordinary people with nowhere to go. So for such a construction project, how much is it worth to spend to reduce the mortality rate? Here, there is also an implicit calculation of the balance of life value. In fact, economists have already calculated the value of life in an economic sense based on data from various countries. Chinese scholars have also done some research on this [1] [2], and concluded that the value of China's vital statistics is generally in the range of 1 million to 7.2 million, and we will temporarily take the value of 5 million.

The Cost of Infection Prevention Strategies

Assuming that the economic loss of 1% of GDP due to large-scale isolation and control, then it is one trillion. According to the calculation of "statistical life value" of 5 million, it may increase the risk of accidental death by 200,000 (persons). If the average life expectancy is reduced by 20,000 days per accidental death, 200,000 people will be 4 billion days, and overall, the average life expectancy in China will be reduced by about 3 days. The calculation of this loss of life expectancy does not take into account the impact of secondary deaths on life expectancy caused by the lack of timely treatment of other diseases due to the occupation of a large number of medical resources by tasks such as nucleic acid testing.

Therefore, combining the previous two methods of calculating the cost of life, a loss of 1% of GDP will reduce the average life expectancy by 3-5 days, which is the cost of isolation and containment required by the infection prevention strategy.

The next question is, how much GDP will Omicron cause? This is of course difficult to calculate, but we have a preliminary analysis, that is, the stronger the transmissibility, the stricter the closure and control measures will inevitably be, and the greater the loss of GDP will be. The strength of transmissibility can be expressed by R0 (basic infection number), and the value of R0 is simply understood as "one person gets sick, how many other people he can infect". The initial Alpha is R0=2-4 (the R0 of influenza is also around 2), the R0 of Delta is about 4, the transmissibility of Omicron is very strong, and the R0 is about 10, which is much stronger than any previous strains, so yes The GDP cost of its anti-infection strategy is also much higher.

In the past two years, we have adopted an anti-infection policy, which has successfully blocked Alpha and Delta, and only paid a relatively small loss of GDP as the price. However, the transmissibility of Omicron is several times that of Alpha and Delta, and a large-scale isolation is often required, so the economic loss of preventing and controlling Omicron may be far greater than 1% of GDP. For example, not long ago, Shenzhen was only closed and controlled for a week, causing a loss of 60-70 billion. According to a study by Professor Song Zheng of the Chinese University of Hong Kong [3], the closure of first-tier cities like Shanghai for one month will reduce the real GDP of the whole of China by 4%. In fact, with the increasing spread of the virus, precise epidemic prevention has become almost impossible, and the frequency of city closures has to be greatly increased. According to statistics, in the first quarter alone, Shanghai, Changchun, Harbin, Xi'an, Shenzhen, etc. have implemented or are undergoing city-wide lockdowns, and more than a dozen first- and second-tier cities have had large-scale partial lockdowns. The closure and control of these cities alone will cause a loss of more than 4% of China's GDP in the first quarter. Moreover, the overall economy is already under great downward pressure. If a large-scale lockdown is imposed for a long time, it will cause negative effects such as rising unemployment and an increase in the number of people returning to poverty. Not to mention the secondary loss of life caused by the occupation of medical resources.

After calculating the cost of the anti-infection strategy, let's calculate the relative benefit of the anti-infection strategy, that is, how many deaths and life expectancy are avoided, and then we need to estimate the fatality rate of different variants. According to a study conducted by British scholars on confirmed cases of different variants in the second half of 2021, the case fatality rate of Alpha is about 1.1% [4]; according to a study of patients infected with Omicron and Delta variant viruses in Ontario, Canada. A retrospective whole population matched cohort study [5], the Delta case fatality rate was 0.3%; according to the statistics of the 2018 influenza season published by the US CDC [6], the case fatality rate of influenza is about 0.1%. The main preliminary research and data show that Omicron is different from previous strains and generally does not invade the lungs. Therefore, the fatality rate of Omicron is much lower than that of previous strains, and may even be lower than that of influenza. We will analyze Omicron in detail later. of the fatality rate.

Influenza Prevention Strategies

We use this model to calculate epidemic prevention strategies against influenza. Since the fatality rate of influenza is about 0.1%, if it is very pessimistically estimated that 50% of the population will be infected (the actual infection rate will be much lower than 50%), it will cause a mortality rate of 5/10,000. Assuming that the average life expectancy of patients who die is 70 years (assuming that the average life expectancy of patients is 80 years), then each patient who dies will be shortened by an average of 10 years of life. Then in terms of mortality rate of 5 in 10,000, life expectancy is reduced by almost 1.8 days (10 years x 5 in 10,000). Therefore, on average, a large-scale influenza outbreak has an impact on the entire human society, equivalent to a reduction in life expectancy of about 1.8 days. For the infection prevention strategy, the gain is only 1.8 days of life lost. However, as we calculated earlier, if we adopt a large-scale infection prevention strategy, only the loss of 1% of GDP will reduce the average life expectancy by 3-5 days. Because of this, we cannot use large-scale isolation and sealing to prevent infection. control strategies to prevent influenza.

The Best Strategy for Dealing with Initial Strains of Covid-19

We can calculate the earliest mutant virus Alpha in the early stage of the epidemic. If Alpha's case fatality rate is 1%, which is about 20 times that of influenza, then the loss of life expectancy is not 1.8 days but 40 days. Then the relative benefit of the infection prevention strategy of large-scale isolation is 40 days. Far greater than the 3-5 day life cost of 1% of GDP. Therefore, for the Alpha virus, the strategy of preventing infection is better than the strategy of preventing death, and it was the right choice to decisively shut down Wuhan at the beginning.

Best Strategy Against Omicron

Let's analyze how to deal with Omicron. First of all, logically, if the fatality rate of Omicron is higher than that of Alpha, and the transmissibility is weaker than that of Alpha, then an infection prevention strategy should be adopted. Adopt a death-prevention strategy. In detail, if a large area is isolated, the resulting loss of life expectancy is: the percentage loss of GDP * (3-5) days (for simplicity, it will be calculated as 4 days later); infection prevention can avoid death and thus obtain The benefit of life expectancy is: (case fatality rate) S*10 years*50% (assuming that 50% of the whole population will eventually be infected), that is, S*3652*50% days.

Compare the life loss caused by the two strategies, that is, when the percentage loss of GDP * 4 days < S * 3652 days * 50%, the anti-infection strategy should be adopted, otherwise the anti-death strategy should be adopted.

From this, it is possible to calculate the threshold value of the fatality rate S of the death prevention strategy under the assumption of different GDP losses: when the GDP loss is 0.5%, the threshold value of S = 0.12%, that is, when the case fatality rate is less than 0.12%, the death prevention strategy should be adopted. Strategy; when GDP loses 1%, S's threshold = 0.22%; when GDP loses 2%, S's threshold = 0.44%, when GDP loses 4%, S's threshold = 0.88%. According to the current level of closure and control required for Omicron, the loss to GDP is at least 4%. It can be seen that even if the fatality rate of Omicron is slightly higher than that of influenza, because of the strong transmissibility of Omicron, the cost of preventing infection may be much higher than that of influenza, and a strategy of preventing death should be adopted. We can be sure that Omicron is much more transmissible than the flu. So what is the fatality rate of Omicron?

Omicron's Case Fatality Rate

According to research data released by Ontario, Canada, the case fatality rate of Omicron is about 0.03%. However, since European and American countries no longer require nucleic acid tests and no longer accurately count the number of infected people, the calculation of the fatality rate is not accurate. However, Asian countries are still counting the number of infected people more accurately, so we can look at the case fatality rate statistics of some Asian countries that are closer to ours.

According to reports, based on the cumulative number of deaths and positive cases from January to February 21, 2022 by the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare, the confirmed case fatality rate of Omicron is estimated to be 0.13% [7]. According to the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KDCA), since December last year, the case fatality rate of the Korean Omicron variant is about 0.18% [8]. Through the data of the past two weeks, we found that the recent confirmed case fatality rate has been reduced to 0.1% [9]. According to the statistics of the case fatality rate in the past 28 days by the Ministry of Health of Singapore, this value is only 0.05% [10]. Through the data of the past two weeks, we found that the confirmed case fatality rate in Singapore in the past two weeks was only 0.03%. Similarly, according to the analysis of confirmed and fatal cases in Vietnam in the past 28 days, the case fatality rate is about 0.03% [11].

Look at Hong Kong, China. According to the epidemic data released by the Hong Kong government [12], there were 7,732 deaths in the fifth wave of the epidemic, and the cumulative number of confirmed and reported cases was 1,150,607 (2021.12.31-2022.4.1), and the calculated case fatality rate was 0.67%. However, since Hong Kong has never had a complete national nucleic acid, it is likely that there are many confirmed cases that are not included in the statistics. The Faculty of Medicine of the University of Hong Kong has calculated through a mathematical model that the actual number of infections far exceeds the official reports or statistics. This estimate has reached 4 million [13]. According to this estimate, the actual fatality rate is below 0.2%, but it is still relatively high.

Case fatality rate in some Asian countries, vaccination status of elderly people and proportion of deaths, proportion of population over 80 years old



Remarks: The vaccination rate and the proportion of deaths in the elderly are from the government websites or public information of each country/region, and the population proportion is from the United Nations database

Explanation of confirmed case fatality rate: South Korea: data from the national statistical database, data time is 2022.3.17-3.31; Singapore: data source Singapore Ministry of Health, data calculation time is 2022.3.17-3.31; Japan: data source Japan Daily News, calculation Time January-February 2022; Hong Kong, China: Data from Hong Kong Department of Health and University of Hong Kong, calculated from December 2021 to April 4, 2022; Vietnam: Data from Johns Hopkins University, calculated from March 2022 .8-4.6; Mainland China data is from the National Health Commission, and the calculation time is from January to March 2022.

It can be seen that the general mortality rate of Omicron is close to or even much lower than that of influenza, with the exception of Hong Kong, China.

Why is the Fatality Rate in Hong Kong so High?

To explain the high death rate in Hong Kong, we need to look at the age distribution of those who died. According to the figures in the third column of the above table, it is not difficult to see that the elderly are the main group of deaths. In Hong Kong, the vaccination rate of the elderly over the age of 80 is only 43%, while the vaccination rate of the elderly in other countries exceeds 90%. According to the data, both domestic vaccines and MRNA vaccines are highly effective in preventing severe illness and death. Therefore, it is not difficult to conclude that the vaccination rate of the elderly in Hong Kong is much lower than that of Singapore, which is the main reason for the high mortality rate in Hong Kong. If Hong Kong, China, can increase the vaccination rate of the elderly to the level of other countries, the case fatality rate can also be reduced to about 0.1%, which is similar to the level of influenza.

The overall vaccination rate in China is relatively high, and the full-course vaccination rate for people over 60 years old has reached 80%. China's overall proportion of 80-year-olds in the total population is only half that of Hong Kong, but the vaccination rate of the elderly over 80 is still relatively low, not reaching the level of Singapore and Japan. The case fatality rate of Omicron in China that we recently observed is already very low. In the first quarter of this year, the case fatality rate of the new coronavirus in mainland China was only 0.004%, which was an order of magnitude lower than that of Singapore. The case fatality rate in Jilin, where the epidemic was more severe, was 0.007% in the same period. Shanghai is 0 [14]. If we continue to increase the vaccination rate of the elderly, we can maintain the fatality rate of Omicron at the level of Vietnam and Singapore, which is 5/10,000, then the reduction of the cost of life expectancy from the death prevention strategy will be less than 1 day, and now it is estimated that the prevention of infection The loss of GDP caused by the strategy will exceed 4%, and the reduction in life expectancy is 16 days, which is much higher than the impact of the death prevention strategy. If the case fatality rate is maintained at 5 per 10,000 (50% infection rate), the number of deaths per year is more than 300,000. More than 3 million people die of cancer in China every year, and the five-year survival rate of cancer in China is 20% lower than that in Japan and South Korea. If we use 1% of GDP to improve the overall medical level, then cancer alone may save a lot. 600,000 people have room for improvement.

Let's review the epidemic prevention model diagram again:

Conclusion

For the current variant of the new coronavirus with high transmission rates but relatively low infection mortality rates, if a mortality prevention strategy is to be adopted, the focus should be on increasing the vaccination rate of high mortality risk groups such as the elderly over 80 years old. The domestic vaccine is also effective in preventing death. Therefore, we must increase the vaccination rate of the elderly as soon as possible. If the mortality rate continues to remain at a very low level, we should actively switch to the death prevention strategy. The anti-death strategy is not a "flattening" policy that is completely ignored, but to allow people with cold symptoms to self-isolate and test, freeing up valuable medical resources for the rescue and observation of critically ill and elderly people, so as to reduce the mortality rate. drop to lowest. Adopting different anti-epidemic strategies in the future does not mean that China's previous prevention and control was in vain. On the contrary, according to our model, the previous anti-infection and containment strategies were very correct, and they won more than two years of precious time. In the stage when the vaccination rate is still relatively low and the virus toxicity is relatively high, a large number of deaths can be avoided at a relatively small cost.

Summary

This essay established a model to analyze and compare the impact of different epidemic prevention strategies against different viruses on life expectancy. It concludes that the best strategy for epidemics such as Alpha and Delta is the anti-infection strategy. Omicron, however, is completely different from those previous strains. The mortality rate of Omicron is much lower and the transmissibility is much stronger, resulting in a substantial increase in the cost of the anti-infection strategy. According to the Omicron case fatality rate statistics in most countries and regions, if the Omicron case fatality rate is close to that of influenza, the life cost of the death prevention strategy is lower. The high mortality rate in Hong Kong is likely due to the low vaccine penetration rate among the elderly. Whether the strategy of the future is to prevent infection or prevent death depends on when we can achieve universal vaccination rates for the elderly.

We believe that as long as we adhere to the concept of people first and life comes first, take into account the life and work order of the people, adopt optimal epidemic prevention strategies scientifically and rationally, and efficiently allocate medical resources and social resources to deal with various diseases including Omicron , the overall loss of life can be minimized.

[1]曾贤刚、蒋妍,2010:空气污染健康损失中统计生命价值评估研究,中国环境科学

[2] ZhaoYang,PanLiu,XinXu: Estimation of social value of statistical life using willingness-to-pay method in Nanjing, China

[3] Jingjing Chen, Wei Chen, Ernest Liu, Jie Luo, and Zheng (Michael) Song:The Economic Cost of Lockdown in China: Evidence from City-to-City Truck Flows.

https://www.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/econ/images/Documents/Truck_Flow_and_COVID19_220315.pdf

[4]medRxiv:

https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.03.05.22271084v1.full#F1

[5]The Journal of the American Medical Association:

https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2789408#:~:text=There%20were%2053%20hospitalizations%20(0.6,%25)%20among%20matched%20Delta%20cases

[6]Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:

https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/burden/2018-2019.html

[7]日本厚生劳动省:https://covid19.mhlw.go.jp/en/

[8]https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/skorea-says-omicron-covid-variant-75-less-likely-kill-than-delta-strain-2022-02-22/

[9]韩国统计厅:https://kosis.kr/covid_eng/covid_index.do

[10]新加坡卫生部:https://www.moh.gov.sg/covid-19/statistics

[11]约翰霍普金斯大学:

[12]衞生署衞生防護中心和醫院管理局:

https://www.coronavirus.gov.hk/pdf/5th_wave_statistics/5th_wave_statistics_20220401.pdf

[13]香港大学医学院孔繁毅等:

http://www.med.hku.hk/en/news/press//-/media/HKU-Med-Fac/News/slides/20220314-sims_wave_5_omicron_2022_03_14_final.ashx

[14]国家卫生健康委员会:http://www.nhc.gov.cn/

 

Monday, April 4, 2022

Covid-19 Series: Censorship of Two Articles About Infections in Shanghai Nursing Home

This blog has previously covered censorship of news reports about the COVID-19 situation China, see "Covid-19 Series: Censorship of News Reports Critical of the Government's Response."

On April 2, 2022, a news editor at the state-sponsored media outlet "Sixth Tone" posted on Twitter that one of their reports titled "Orderlies at Shanghai Nursing Home Describe Chaos Amid Outbreak" regarding the COVID situation at Shanghai's Donghai Elderly Care Hospital had been "disappeared." https://twitter.com/bibekbhandari/status/1510142365100646400

 Some excerpts:

Substitute orderlies at one of Shanghai’s largest old age homes said they were unaware during recruitment that their tasks would involve nursing residents infected with the coronavirus. They described a chaotic situation: workers trapped in the hospital, a lack of basic hygiene in living quarters, and mixing COVID-19 patients with others.
. . . .
Shanghai has seen a daily uptick in coronavirus cases for weeks now, and the city on Monday announced a two-phase lockdown to test its nearly 25 million people and contain the virus. Authorities have said that most new infections were detected either among people in central quarantine facilities or those in elevated risk areas that were sealed even before the lockdown started.

However, the outbreak at the Donghai Elderly Care Hospital suggests the existence of a hidden chain of transmission that hadn’t previously been reported in the city.

His tweet included a link to an archived version of the article: https://web.archive.org/web/20220401105539/https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1010042/.

The same day, observers noted that another story about the COVID situation in a Shanghai elder care center had also been deleted, this time it was an article from the state sponsored media outlet Caixin (财新网) titled "COVID-19 Hits Donghai Nursing Home" (新冠侵袭东海养老院). An archive of the original paywalled-version is available here: https://web.archive.org/web/20220402091703/https://www.caixin.com/2022-04-02/101865276.html. The full article is archived here: http://archive.today/2022.04.04-002623/https://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1ss0hpi. Below is a translation of the portion of the text originally available outside the paywall.

COVID-19 Hits Donghai Nursing Home

The weakest link in the prevention and control of the COVID-19 epidemic is under attack. Some medical staff in the Donghai Nursing Home have been transferred and quarantined. There is not enough to ensure the welfare of the patients and the elderly in the facility. The management of the temporarily recruited nurses is scattered, and the normal care order has suffered a huge impact.

Nursing homes, the weakest link in the prevention and control of the COVID-19 epidemic, have been hit by the COVID-19 virus in this round of the Shanghai epidemic.

After Puxi, which has a population of 16 million, launched lock-downs and screening on April 2, the Shanghai Municipal Health Commission announced that on April 1, 260 new local confirmed cases of COVID pneumonia and 6,051 asymptomatic infections were added. A new high for this round of the epidemic. According to comprehensive information, the number of infected people in Shanghai reached more than 36,000 in March alone, and most of them were asymptomatic infections. Unfortunately, many elderly care facilities are deeply involved in the epidemic. Based on the information reported by the Shanghai Health and Health Commission, the Shinan Nursing Home and Donghai Nursing Hospital in the Pudong New Area have experienced recurring COVID-19 outbreaks. Caixin has learned from multiple sources that there have been hundreds of positive infections at the Donghai Elderly Care Hospital, including the elderly, hospital nurses, and health care workers. Recently, elderly individuals have died in nursing homes, and whether this is related to COVID-19 has not yet been determined.


新冠侵袭东海养老院

新冠疫情防控最薄弱的环节被击中。东海养老院一些医护人员被转移隔离,院中病患或老人生活保障不足,临时招募的护工管理散乱,正常照护秩序遭受巨大冲击

养老护理院,新冠疫情防控最薄弱的环节,在此轮上海疫情中被新冠病毒击中。

在1600万人口的浦西启动封控筛查后,4月2日,上海市卫健委通报: 4月1日新增本土新冠肺炎确诊病例260例和无症状感染者6051例。再创本轮疫情新高。综合通报信息,上海感染者仅3月一个月已达3.6万余人,多为无症状感染者。多家养老机构不幸深陷疫情。综合上海卫健委通报信息,浦东新区市南养老院和东海老年护理医院曾先后出现新冠疫情。财新从多个信源获悉,东海老年护理医院的阳性感染者已达上百人,其中包括老人、医院医护以及护工。近期养老院已有老人去世,是否与新冠有关暂未能确定。



Tuesday, February 23, 2021

Covid-19 Series: Censorship of News Reports Critical of the Government's Response

It is not possible to list here all of the news articles that were censored from January to April 2020. The censorship of three articles published by China's more reputable state sponsored media outlets is described in detail below. Approximately 20 more examples are listed at the bottom of this post.

Caixin Cover Story 


Title: They Fought the Battle to the End [他们打满全场]
Date Published: April 10, 2020
Date Censored: April 11 or 12, 2020
Publisher: 财新周刊
Original URL: http://weekly.caixin.com/2020-04-10/101540932.html
Archived URL:  https://web.archive.org/web/20200411204707/http://weekly.caixin.com/2020-04-10/101540932.html
Cover: http://weekly.caixin.com/2020/cw900/
 

Evidence Of Censorship: The screenshots on the left and right below show that for the issues immediately preceding and following the April 13 issue, Caixin featured links to its cover story (outlined in blue). The screenshot in the middle shows that for the April 13 issue, Caixin does not provide any link to its cover story (outlined in red).


In addition, the screenshot on the left below shows a Google cache of Caxin's cover story index page as it appeared on April 11, 2020, with the "They Fought the Battle to the End [他们打满全场]" featured at the top (outlined in blue). The screenshot on the right shows the same page as it appeared on April 13, 2020, and that story has been removed.

Excerpts:
 
Li Yirong told Caixin reporters that the National Key Laboratory of Virology of Wuhan University and the research team of Zhongnan Hospital did not upload the whole genome sequence of the new coronavirus to GISAID until January 23. "Because the relevant departments do not allow private pathogenic testing, and we were not allowed to publish relevant pathogen testing or experimental results without authorization, we were very cautious in releasing information.
 
李一荣告诉财新记者,武大病毒学国家重点实验室和中南医院研究团队直到1月23日才将新冠病毒的全基因组序列上传至GISAID。“因为有关部门不允许私自做病原学检测,不得擅自对外发布有关病原检测或实验结果,我们发布信息很谨慎。”

China Newsweek Cover Story

 

Title: The Regret of Wuhan: How China Missed the Critical Window for Controlling the Coronavirus Outbreak [武汉之憾:黄金防控期是如何错过的]
Date Published: Online version was published on February 5, 2020. Magazine was dated February 10, 2020.
Date Censored: Some time before February 9, 2020.
Publisher:中国新闻周刊
Original URL: https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2020-02-05/doc-iimxyqvz0431055.shtml | https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/utrKt3oYGdIsjKOcyzlBmQ
Archived URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20200205115627/https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2020-02-05/doc-iimxyqvz0431055.shtml | https://archive.li/SPwN3/image
Cover: https://finance.sina.cn/2020-02-05/detail-iimxyqvz0352015.d.html
Translation: https://chinachange.org/2020/02/09/the-regret-of-wuhan-how-china-missed-the-critical-window-for-controlling-the-coronavirus-outbreak/
 
Evidence of Censorship: The screenshot on the left below shows a Google cache version of the article as it appeared on February 5, 2020. The screenshot on the right shows the same URL as it appeared on February 9, 2020.
 


In addition, the screenshot below shows that a search on China Newsweek's search engine for the title of the article returns no results.
 

Finally, the screenshot on the left below shows an archived version of the article as it appeared on February 5, 2020. The screenshot on the right shows the same URL as it appeared on December 17, 2020.

Excerpts:

Lin Yu, a doctor at the Union Hospital, affiliated with Huazhong University of Science and Technology’s Tongji Medical School described his recollections in an interview with China News Weekly. He said that at the beginning of the outbreak, the Wuhan municipal government’s policy for dealing with the problem was “cold handling”. The hospital where Lin worked issued a notice saying that barring explicit permission from the work unit, no one was allowed to discuss the sickness using their personal communication channels or give interviews with the media. In addition to the clinical system, information was also strictly controlled at the hospital infection-control department and at the CDC. “You weren’t allowed to say anything all.” The only thing the doctor could do was repeatedly exhort those seeking treatment: “wear masks, you must buy and wear masks.” They also made loaded jokes, like “avoid Huanan Seafood Market, the products there aren’t fresh.”

林羽是华中科技大学同济医学院附属协和医院的医生,他对《中国新闻周刊》回忆说,疫情刚开始的时候,武汉市的策略都是“冷处理”。他所在的医院就通知,在没有单位授权的时候,不允许私自在公众平台谈论病情,不允许私自接受媒体采访,不仅仅是临床系统,包括院感、CDC那边消息管控更严重,“整个就不让说”。当时,医生们唯一能做的,就是一再嘱咐就诊患者“口罩、口罩、一定要买口罩、戴口罩”,甚至半开玩笑地嘱咐“不要去华南海鲜市场买东西,那里东西不新鲜”。

Caijing WeChat Post


Title: People Outside the Statistics: Did They Die of “Ordinary Pneumonia”? [统计数字之外的人:他们死于“普通肺炎”?]
Date Published: February 1, 2020
Date Censored: February 2, 2020
Publisher: 财经杂志 (Official WeChat Public Account)
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/OQGVZlrJWID9Gn4A_T5u_g
Archived URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20200201152342/https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/OQGVZlrJWID9Gn4A_T5u_g
Translation: https://github.com/memoryhonest/nCovMemory-en/blob/master/docs/2020-02-01/excluded_from_the_statistics.md
 
Evidence Of Censorship: The screenshot on the left below shows the post as it appeared on the morning of February 2, 2020. The  screenshot on the right below shows the post as it appeared on the afternoon of February 2, 2020 - that text reads "Unable to view this content because it violates regulations. This content was reported and determined to be in violation of the Provisions on the Administration of Internet User Public Account Information Services. View Details" [此内容因违规无法查看. 接相关投诉,此内容违反《互联网用户公众帐号信息服务管理规定》,查看详细内容].




The screenshot below shows the English language version of that censorship notice.
 



Excerpts:

On January 26, 2020, Liu Mei's family received a cremation notice. Her mother-in-law, a 73-year-old woman, had been at home when she stopped breathing, and died after being sent to the hospital after resuscitation attempts had failed.
 
Liu Mei told "Caijing" reporters that the elderly woman had developed symptoms of the suspected new coronavirus pneumonia on January 21. After examination at the Wuhan No. 4 Hospital, the diagnosis showed that her lungs were highly infected. However, the elderly woman was moved to several hospitals and was not admitted to any of them, so she could only isolate herself at home until she became critically ill.
 
After the elderly woman was taken away by the ambulance her family never saw her again. The last thing they received was a cremation notice, which listed the cause of death of the elderly woman as viral pneumonia. However, according to family members, the death of the elderly woman was not counted in the number of confirmed deaths from novel coronavirus pneumonia because until her death, she was not eligible for hospitalization and was not diagnosed with novel coronavirus pneumonia, and could only be counted as having the misfortune to die from "common pneumonia."
 
The elderly woman passed away quickly, with no time for proper arrangements to be made or for family members to see her off. Her ashes remain in the funeral home.
 
The members of Liu Mei's family whose relative died without treatment are not alone. "Caijing" reporters have conducted several investigations and have learned that, although the number of outpatients exhibiting fevers in major designated hospitals in Wuhan has declined compared with the time when the city was "closed" on January 23, and a third batch of designated hospital has been opened, the lack of hospital beds has not been fully alleviated. While the number of confirmed and suspected cases has risen, there are still many lives hanging by a thread outside the epidemic statistics.
 
A department director of a designated hospital told a "Caijing" reporter that there were about 120 patients with fever a day in the outpatient clinic of the hospital in the past two days, of which about 80 had lung infections, but only 5 may were eventually admitted to hospital.

2020年1月26日,刘梅一家接到了一张火化单。她的婆婆、73岁的老人在家中没了呼吸,送去医院抢救无效后死亡。
 
刘梅告诉《财经》记者,老人在1月21日出现疑似新型冠状病毒肺炎的症状,在武汉市第四医院检查后诊断结果显示肺部高度感染。但老人辗转数家医院仍未被住院收治,只能在家自我隔离,直至病危。
 
老人被送上救护车后,家人再没见过她。他们最后收到的只有一张火化单,显示老人的死亡原因是:病毒性肺炎。但据家人说,老人的离世并未被计入新冠肺炎的确诊死亡数字中——因为直到去世,她也没有得到住院资格,也没有被确诊为新冠肺炎,只能被算作因“普通肺炎”而去世的不幸者。
 
老人仓促离世,没有体面的收拾、没有家属的送别,至今骨灰还在殡仪馆里。
 
刘梅家得不到救治而离世的亲人并非孤例。《财经》记者多方调查了解到,尽管目前武汉各大定点医院发热门诊的就医人数比1月23日刚“封城”时有所下降,定点医院也已开至第三批,但一床难求的情况并没有完全得到缓解。确诊、疑似数字攀升的同时,仍有很多疫情统计数字之外的人命悬一线。
 
一位定点医院的科室主任告诉《财经》记者,这两天医院门诊一天有120名左右发热病人,其中大约80名有肺部感染,但只有5名可能最终被收住院。

Additional Examples of Articles That Were Censored or Deleted

Caijing [财经]

Workers at Huoshenshan Wanted to Return Home: At Least Nine People Were Confirmed Infected, Their Livelihoods at Risk [火神山工人想回家:至少9人确诊,生计暂难为继 ]
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FfB6QgnxjCBAoD4lPEDrIQ
Archived Version: http://archive.today/jP0mK | https://web.archive.org/web/20200318150008/https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FfB6QgnxjCBAoD4lPEDrIQ

In Order to Meet Resumption Quotas, Some Zhejiang Enterprises are Exaggerate Utility Usage [为达标复工率,浙江部分企业注水用电量]
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/G2EtbaG_bLTpWlNThuNUrw
Archived Version: http://archive.ph/gYf0F

Exclusive Interview With Second Batch of Experts Deployed by the Ministry of Health: Why Have We Not Seen Person-to-Person Transmission? [专访卫健委派武汉第二批专家:为何没发现人传人?]
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/jY9NEElLmLckv4k7Workog
Archived Version: http://archive.today/6MyfO

Discriminated Against, Evicted, and Fired, Hubei Mirgrant Workers Live in Abandoned Buildings in Shenzhen [受歧视遭退租被辞工,湖北籍农民工流落深圳烂尾楼]
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4ZFzdJXlYUvNiFzpy7DUrA
Archived Version: http://archive.today/Elyw2

Gao Fu Responds to the Controversy: I'm Not Online Arguing Because I'm Researching a Cunning Virus [高福回应争议:不能去网络吵架,在研究狡猾病毒]
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/RBjSumb2wh7sRoCRaNyS1Q
Archived Version: http://archive.today/XCiq9

Three Barriers Those Suspected of Beijing Infected in Wuhan Must Surmount to Get a Hospital Room [武汉疑似患者通往病房的三道难关]
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/emhJaE4O4ElsCntcJDJLWw
Archived Version: http://archive.today/GbY4J

Caixin [财新]

Pneumonia Diary | March 19: The Result of the Investigation into Li Wenliang is Announced, The Public Cries for More Action Against Those Responsible [肺炎日记|3月19日:李文亮调查结果公布,舆论呼吁继续追责]
Original URL: http://www.caixin.com/2020-03-20/101531330.html
Archived Version: http://archive.ph/wTJ4j

Suspicions Many Retested Positive: The Full Story of the Deaths of People Discharged from the Hospital After Recovering from the Novel Coronavirus [复阳疑云:新冠患者出院后死亡事件始末]
Original URL: http://www.caixin.com/2020-03-05/101524370.html
Archived Version: http://archive.ph/pJNx6

Lights, Air, and Machinery Turned on to "Meet Quotas" - How Reliable are the Country's Work Resumption Numbers [开灯开空调开机器“冲指标” 全国复工数据有多少水分]
Original URL: http://companies.caixin.com/2020-03-03/101523137.html
Archived Version: https://web.archive.org/web/20200303162758/http://companies.caixin.com/2020-03-03/101523137.html

Tracing Gene Sequencing of the Novel Coronavirus: When Did the Alarm Sound [新冠病毒基因测序溯源:警报是何时拉响的]
Original URL: http://china.caixin.com/2020-02-26/101520972.html
Archived Version: https://archive.li/YylMt

Voices from the Front Line Physicians: We Need Help from the International Medical Community [来自前线医生的声音:请国际同行支援我们]
Original URL: http://www.caixin.com/2020-02-26/101520806.html
Archived Version: http://archive.is/zrtaK

Four Members of a Hubei Movie Theater Workers Family Died One After Another: Attention Needs to Be Paid to Families With High Novel Coronavirus Mortality Rates [湖北电影厂员工一家四口接连去世 新冠家庭死亡率高企需关注]
Original URL: http://www.caixin.com/2020-02-16/101516206.html
Archived Version: http://archive.is/iZ7PK

Four Members of a Hubei Movie Theater Workers Family Died One After Another: Liu Fan and Chang Kai are Siblings (Updated) [湖北电影厂员工一家四口接连去世 柳帆常凯实为姐弟(更新)]
Original URL: https://china.caixin.com/2020-02-18/101516203.html
Archived Version: https://archive.li/syczr

Southern Group [南方周末/南方人物周刊]

Family Members of the Deceased in Wuhan: Waiting to Receive Ashes, Waiting for a Way to Express Grief [武汉逝者家属:等待领取骨灰,等待表达悲痛的方式]
Original URL: https://www.infzm.com/contents/179409
Archived Version: http://archive.vn/tepX8

From Discovery to Shutdown, Frontline Medical Workers in Wuhan on Why the Epidemic Broke Out [从发现到封城,武汉一线医护复盘疫情为何爆发]
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/tKNwe5bY-rCqhl-juJWqrg
Archived Version: https://archive.vn/T5wcv

Over 160 Hospital Around the Country Plea to the Public for Help, Why is there not Enough Medical Resources and Equipment ? [全国160余家医院向社会求援,医疗物资储备为何不足?]
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/SEeoUXwzcfuikvwz46zvDA
Archived Version: http://archive.is/IAgnb

Sanlian Weekly [三联生活周刊]

From the Scene: Huoshenshan Opens: Who Should the Hospital Beds be Reserved For? [现场:火神山开通:病床该留给谁?]
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/07-eyh4PxUtXf2F_WHpApQ
Archived Version: https://web.archive.org/web/20200204055934/https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/07-eyh4PxUtXf2F_WHpApQ

Global Times [环球时报]

Medical Workers from Wuhan Central Hospital Confess their True Feelings: The Epidemic is Like Looking in a Demon Mirror [武汉市中心医院医护人员吐真情:疫情是面照妖镜]
Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/tBKwTE1FPN_uO_Vp2Zm_0w
Archived Version: https://archive.li/2isMJ

Thursday, February 11, 2021

Examples of Censorship and Sanctions of Speech About Public Events in China

1. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

According to China's state sponsored media, China's government attempted to cover up the scope of SARS infections during the 2003 outbreak. For example:

On April 3, former Health Minister Zhang Wenkang announced at a press conference held by the State Council Information Office that Beijing had reported 12 SARS cases and 3 deaths by March 31, while repeating again and again that China had effectively controlled the spread of SARS in relevant areas. Minister Zhang, cheerful and smiling, deeply impressed audiences with his comments to a foreign photojournalist who was wearing a gauze mask at the conference: "You are safe here whether you wear the gauze mask or not."  . . . .

On April 10, the World Health Organization (WHO) publicly criticized Beijing's epidemic reporting system, pointing out that few hospitals in Beijing had daily SARS case reports. WHO sent experts to Beijing for investigation. On April 11, Beijing was designated as an infected area. However, the Ministry of Health didn't publish the news. Instead, it maintained the previous day's optimistic statement, saying, "The published epidemic information that day included all diagnosed cases in local and army hospitals." . . . .

On April 20, Vice Minister of Health Gao Qiang announced at a press conference that Beijing reported 339 diagnosed SARS cases and 402 suspected cases. On the same day, Xinhua News Agency said that the CPC Central Committee had dismissed former Health Minister Zhang Wenkang and former Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong.

See, "A Chinese Doctor's Extraordinary April in 2003," Sanlian Life Weekly, No. 23, translated by China.org.cn staff, June 13, 2003, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Jun/66953.htm.

Besides the lack of experience and an emergency response system at the time of the SARS outbreak, a major reason that the disease took such a big toll on people's lives was the official coverup.

In March 2003, Tong, the respiratory physician, was asked to consult on SARS patients in Beijing along with other doctors. There were dozens, if not hundreds of cases, at the time in Beijing. But the public knew very little of what was really going on.

"I knew that things like this couldn't be kept a secret forever; the truth would come out eventually," said Tong.

There were already rumors around the country about the disease and some people were stocking up on masks, vinegar and cough medicines. But accurate, authoritative information was scarce.

The authorities didn't address the issue until early April, when Zhang Wenkang, health minister at the time, downplayed the situation at a press conference and said there were over 1,000 cases in China and only 13 cases in Beijing. He reassured the public that the disease was under control.

The officials didn't face the truth until Jiang Yanyong, a retired doctor from the PLA General Hospital (also known as 301 Hospital) in Beijing, blew the whistle and told Time magazine that there were many more cases than officials had disclosed. On April 20, health officials updated the number of cases in Beijing to 339 and over 1,800 in the country.

It was an attempt to maintain stability and harmony prior to the annual legislative meetings, analysts later sought to explain the coverups.

See, "Legacy of the SARS outbreak," February 21, 2013, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/763304.shtml

At that time China's state sponsored media hailed Jiang Yanyong's whistleblowing: "Referring to his speaking out, Professor Jiang said: 'I believe what I did as a doctor has played a certain role in combating the epidemic.'" People's Daily, May 21, 2003,  http://en.people.cn/200305/21/eng20030521_117004.shtml. But as shown by these screenshots below taken on March 8, 2015, Baidu was still censoring search results for "Jiang Yanyong" [蒋彦永], and had banned users from establishing a forum to discuss him.


During 2003, while it was praising Jiang Yanyong, China's government punished other people for posting online about SARS. For example:

  • An April 23, 2003 People's Daily report titled "Person Detained for Spreading Rumors of an 'unknown virus spreading in Beijing'" [网上散布'北京有不明疫情蔓延'谣言者被捕] stated: "On April 11, a message posted on the Internet with the signature "Steven Shen" stated that "an epidemic that has not yet been diagnosed" is spreading in Beijing, and has "taken the lives of 143 people." This information is purely a rumor. Beijing has never had an "unknown epidemic" spread. . . . According to the provisions of Article 291 of the Criminal Law, the public security organs have detained and reviewed the perpetrators suspected of fabricating and disseminating the harmful information. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), on April 10 "A growing number of investigative media reports suggest that cases in Beijing military hospitals are not being frankly reported." See: "Update 95 - SARS: Chronology of a serial killer," July 4, 2003. https://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_07_04/en/
  • On May 3, 2003, police in Beijing detained Huang Qunwei for posting articles on the Internet between April 25-27 with titles such as ""Absolutely Reliable News, Shanghai Concealed a Large Number of SARS Cases" and "China has Officially Entered an Economic Crisis Due to SARS." The government would later sentence him to three years imprisonment for fabricating and intentionally publicizing false terrorist information. See, State v. Huang Qunwei, (2003) First Intermediate First Instance No. 14991 [黄群威刑事判决书,(2003)一中刑初字第1499号]. According to the WHO's "Chronology," on April 30, "China, accounting for 3460 probable cases of the global total of 5663, now has more cases than the rest of the world combined."

2.  The 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake

In 2008, China's government censored information and punished several people who shared information about the May 12, 2008 earthquake in Wenchuan, Sichuan. For example:

  • China's search engines censored search results relating to the earthquake.  For example, this  screenshot was taken on June 16, 2008, and shows a search on Yahoo.cn for "Wenchuan Earthquake Tangshan Earthquake" [汶川地震 唐山地震] returned no results, just a notice saying "The keywords you entered may implicate content that does not comply with relevant laws and regulations." [你输入的关键字可能涉及不符合相关法律法规的内容]. 
Similarly, this screenshot was taken on June 17, 2008, and shows a search on Baidu for "Earthquake Tofu Dregs Construction" [汶川地震 唐山地震] returned no results, just a notice saying "Search results may implicate content that does not comply with relevant laws, regulations, and policies, and have not been displayed." [搜索结果可能涉及不符合相关法律规定和政策的内容,未予显示].
  • According to a July 29, 2019 Xinhua report published on the China Daily website titled "12-year sentence for China dissident on state secrets charge": "Huang [Qi], who founded a website documenting official rights abuses, has been jailed twice before, including in 2008 after advocating for parents whose children were killed in a massive earthquake in the southwestern province of Sichuan. Thousands of students died when their shoddily built schools collapsed, but the government has never made public the results of any investigation or held anyone accountable."
  • According to an August 13, 2009 China Daily report titled "Activist on trial for subversion": "Tan Zuoren, who had been investigating the deaths of students in last year's Sichuan earthquake, stood trial yesterday for subversion. Tan, a 55-year-old local resident, was accused of telling lies to foreign media organizations after the quake and so 'greatly staining the image of the government and the Party,' according to the indictment offered by Tan's lawyer Pu Zhiqiang." See, State v. Tan Zuoren, (2009) Cheng Xing Criminal First No. 273 [谭作人刑事判决书, (2009)成刑初字第273号].
  • On May 18, 2008, Guo Quan was subjected to 10 days administrative detention for using the "5.12" Wenchuan earthquake to assemble dozens of fictitious experts on the Internet on May 13, 2008 in a "China New Democracy Party Disaster Relief Committee" to spread rumors and disturb public order. See, State v. Guo Quan, (2009) Su Intermediate Criminal Second First Instance No. 00021 [郭泉刑事判决书, (2009)宿中刑二初字第0002号].

On May 12, 2011, on the third anniversary of the Wenchuan earthquake, the Southern Metropolitan Daily, published by the Propaganda Department of the Guangdong Communist Party Committee, published an editorial entitled "Cherishing Their Memory as We are Borne on the River of Time. "  [躺在时间的河流上怀念他们]

In our hearts, we lowered our flags to half mast for them. On the day of mourning we called them home and wished them peace. We gathered together all the human evidence of them we could. We read their names together. We promised that we would bear them constantly in mind, never forgetting, over and over again. We did so much, and yet we did too little. Those of you who were lost and did not return, where are you? Can the light we kindle shine across your path? We cannot do more. We can but present steel zodiacs, and offer up porcelain sunflower seeds, symbolic memorials to your lives once so tangible. What else would you wish us to do? 

 The editorial contained several oblique references to Ai Weiwei:

  • "Read their names together": a reference to Ai Weiwei's project to post the names of the school children who died in the earthquake on Twitter on their birthdays.
  • "Steel zodiacs": a reference to the installation of twelve zodiac animal heads by Ai Weiwei called "Circle of Animals Zodiac Heads." It is an outdoor public sculpture exhibition that opened in May 2011 at the Pulitzer Fountain at the Grand Army Plaza in New York City.
  • "Porcelain sunflower seeds": a reference to the installation of millions of hand painted porcelain sunflower seeds by Ai Weiwei that opened at the Tate Modern in 2010.

On the Southern Metropolitan Daily's online edition, the title of the article with the link to the
article was replaced with the characters for "Advertisement" [广告].

The screenshots below show that the online article itself was replaced with a notice saying "Very sorry, this article has already been deleted! "  [很抱歉,该文章已经被删除!]

(Translation of the article by David Bandurski of the China Media Project - http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/05/12/12235)

3. Babies Poisoned by Melamine in Milk Formula

In 2008, 290,000 infants had to be treated for renal complications and 6 others died as a direct result of the  deliberate contamination of infant formula and related dairy products with melamine to make it appear to contain more protein.  21 people were sentenced for their involvement, and two received death sentences. At least four government officials were fired in connection with the scandal. See, "4 officials sacked following baby milk scandal," China Daily, September 17, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-09/17/content_7034236.htm.

In 2010, Zhao Lianhai was sentenced to 2 1/2 years imprisonment for "disturbing social order" after he started the "Home for Kidney Stone Babies" (结石宝宝之家, jieshibaobao.com) website and attempted to lead parents in getting restitution and treatment for their children who had been poisoned by Sanlu's melamine-tainted milk powder. China's search engines and social media websites censored information about Zhao's case. See, http://blog.feichangdao.com/2013/08/searching-for-information-about-milk.html

4. The 2011 Wenzhou Train Collision

On July 23, 2011 when two high-speed trains collided on a viaduct in the suburbs of Wenzhou, Zhejiang. The two trains derailed each other, and four cars fell off the viaduct leaving 40 passengers dead and 172 injured. According to a Global Times report published a year later:

Although boasting one of the fastest high-speed trains in the world, the way the Ministry of Railways (MOR) disposed of the wreckage and delayed the results of an investigation into the crash sparked public fury and widespread doubt as to the wisdom of the massive investment in high-speed railways. . . . The investigation report, which was released five months after the deadly crash, blamed the cause on flaws in the trains' operation control system and on an inadequate emergency response by railway authorities. A total of 54 people were identified as being accountable for the crash and received disciplinary punishment. Liu Zhijun and Zhang Shuguang, the former railway minister and deputy chief engineer of the ministry respectively, were mainly said as being to blame and were placed under investigation last year for alleged "severe violation of discipline." But the charges against them are not directly related to the train crash.

See, "Trained the wrong way," Global Times, July 19, 2012, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/722139.shtm

According to a October 18, 2014 Global Times report titled "Railway official sentenced to 'death with reprieve'" https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/886953.shtml:

The Beijing No.2 Intermediate People's Court also deprived Zhang Shuguang, former head of the now defunct Railway Ministry's transportation bureau and deputy chief engineer, of political rights for life and confiscated all his property. According to the court, Zhang took bribes worth more than 47 million yuan from 14 companies between 2000 and 2011, when he was serving in a variety of positions in the ministry. In particular, some 18.5 million yuan was offered by Wuhan Zheng Yuan Railway Electric Co Ltd under the guise of real estate purchases and membership applications to the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In exchange, Zhang would help with contracts related to the sale of trains or parts and the bidding of projects, according to the court.

On July 31 and August 1, 2011, several news outlets published reports claiming Zhang Shuguang [张曙光] was involved in corruption. The screenshots below show that they were deleted within 24 hours.


On July 26, 2011 author and blogger Han Han (韩寒) posted an essay titled "A Country Off the Rails" [脱节的国度] on his Sina Blog . Some excerpts:

You keep asking why they run around like a bunch of lunatics, but they feel that they are paragons of restraint and patience.
You keep asking why they say white is black and black is white, but they feel that they are just telling it like it is.
You keep asking why they shield the murderers, but they feel ashamed they have to give the shaft to their friends-with-benefits.
You keep asking why they cover up the truth, but they feel that they are already very transparent and open.
You keep asking why their lives are so corrupt, but they feel that they lead spartan and simple lives.
You keep asking why they are so arrogant, but they feel that they are profiles in humility.

You feel aggrieved, and they also feel aggrieved. They think that under the rule of the Qing government, ordinary people couldn't even look at TV sets. Now TV sets have entered thousands of households. What great progress this is!
 
They feel that they built this, and they built that, and you don’t care what happens in the process and you don’t care who it is for, as long as you get to use it. You used to take a day and a night to take the train from Shanghai to Beijing. Now, as long as you don’t get struck by lightning, you'll be there in five hours. Why are you not grateful? Why are you so full of doubts?

. . . .

The reason why the country does not progress is because many among them have been measuring themselves by the Mao Zedong and Stalin era, so they always feel that they are too wronged, too open, too fair, too kind, too low profile. It's not easy. They regard the pace of technology enveloping the times as an illusion of their own initiative and openness, so the more you criticize him, the more he desires totalitarianism, and the more you engage in him, the more he misses Mao.
 
A friend in State machine told me: you people are never satisfied. If a literati like you had been around forty years ago, you would have been shot. Now you tell me whether this era is progressive or regressive.

I said, you people are never satisfied. If you offered this point of view ninety years ago, you would have been laughed to death. So you tell me, when all is said and done are we living in an age of progress or what.

你一直问,他们何以如此的丧心病狂,他们却觉得自己已经非常的克制忍让。
你一直问,他们何以如此的颠倒黑白,他们却觉得自己已经非常的公正坦率。
你一直问,他们何以如此的包庇凶手,他们却觉得自己已经非常的愧对炮友。
你一直问,他们何以如此的掩盖真相,他们却觉得自己已经非常的透明开放。
你一直问,他们何以如此的生活腐化,他们却觉得自己已经非常的艰苦朴素。
你一直问,他们何以如此的骄横傲慢,他们却觉得自己已经非常的姿态低下。

你觉得自己很委屈,他们也觉得自己很委屈,他们认为,在清政府的统治下,老百姓连电视机都看不上,现在电视机已经走进了千家万户,这是多大的进步。
 
他们觉得,我们建了这个,我们建了那个,你别管过程中发生了什么,也别管这是给谁献礼,至少你用到了吧。你以前从上海到北京火车要一天一夜,现在只要不被雷劈,五个小时就到了,你为何不感激,为何充满了质疑?

. . . .

国家为什么不进步,是因为他们中的很多人一直在用毛泽东斯大林时代的他们来衡量自己,所以他们永远觉得自己太委屈了,太开明了,太公正了,太仁慈了,太低姿态了,太不容易了。他们将科技裹着时代向前走的步伐当成了自己主动开放的幻象,于是你越批评他,他越渴望极权,你越搞毛他,他越怀念毛。
 
有一个国家机器朋友对我说,你们就是不知足,你这样的文人,要是搁在四十年前,你就被枪毙了,你说这个时代,是进步了还是退步了。


我说,你们就是不知足,你这样的观点,要是搁在九十年前,早就被人笑死了,你说这个时代,他到底是进步了还是。

The screenshot below on the left shows the blog post as it appeared on July 27, 2011, and the screenshot on the right shows that it was deleted several hours later that same day.

 
Another target for censorship were posts on Sina Weibo asking users to vote on certain topics related to the train crash in the days after disaster. The screenshots below show three such posts that were deleted the same day they were posted:
 
"Are You Satisfied with the Handling of the 'Wenzhou Train Collision' Accident?"  (Vote #690625)
 


"Burying the Train Cars, Do You Believe the Rationale?" (Vote #692592)
 

 
"Has the Handling of the 'Wenzhou Train Collision' Accident Left You Satisfied?" ( Vote #695734)
 

5. Babies Poisoned by Mercury in Milk Formula

On June 15, 2012, the state sponsored Global Times reported: "Dairy producer Mongolia Yili Industrial Group Co said yesterday that it has started recalling most of its Quanyou series formula milk powder produced from November 2011 to May 2012 since Wednesday, due to excessive mercury content which is harmful to the nervous system." See, "Yili recalls milk powder," Global Times, June 15, 2012.

The same day China's social media networks began censoring search results for "Yili mercury" [伊利 汞].  See, http://blog.feichangdao.com/2013/08/searching-for-information-about-milk.html.

6. The 2012 Beijing Floods

On July 23, 2012, the Global Times reported: "The heaviest rainstorms in 61 years hit the capital over the weekend, resulting in 37 deaths recorded as of 5 pm Sunday, authorities have announced.  A total of 25 people drowned, six were killed by collapsing houses, five by electrocution, and one by lightning strike, the Beijing municipal government said on its Sina Weibo account. Over 1.9 million residents have been affected, officials say." See, "Outdated drainage blamed for flood havoc," Global Times, July 23, 2012, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/722780.shtml.

Within 48 hours, Sina Weibo began censoring all searches containing the term "death toll." [死亡人数] Articles in China's state sponsored media that contradicted official death toll claims were deleted. See, http://blog.feichangdao.com/2012/07/sina-weibo-censors-searches-relating-to.html and http://blog.feichangdao.com/2012/08/rumor-of-economic-observers-shuttering.html.

7. Beijing Mass Suicide Attempt in 2013

In August 2013 China's state sponsored media reported that ten people tried to commit suicide by drinking pesticide on a busy street near Beijing West Railway Station. Those media reports were deleted and China's social media websites censored results for searches related to the incident. See, http://blog.feichangdao.com/2013/12/sina-weibo-censors-searches-about-mass.html and http://blog.feichangdao.com/2013/08/chinas-weibos-news-sites-censor-report.html.

8. The 2013 Lushan Earthquake

In April, 20, 2013,  more than 100 people were killed and thousands were injured after a 7.0-magnitude earthquake hit Lushan county in Sichuan.

  • On April 22,  China's social media websites began censoring search results for "Fan Jiyue" (范继跃) and "Lushan County Party Secretary" (芦山县委书记) after reports emerged Fan Jiyue, party leader of Lushan county, had taken off an expensive luxury wristwatch prior to participating in a photo-op with  Premier Li Keqiang during quake-relief work on April 21. See, http://blog.feichangdao.com/2013/04/2013-sichuan-earthquake-web-sites.html.
  • On April 23, the state-sponsored Southern Metropolis Daily published an article on its web site entitled "Disaster Victims Blocked by Broken Transportation Lines Assemble to Call Out 'I'm Cold, I'm Hungry'." (交通受阻受灾民众聚集拉幅称“我冷我饿”). According to the article the featured photo showed: "Disaster victims in Lingguan village, Baoxing county, Sichuan, holding up banners saying 'I'm cold I'm hungry' have drawn the attention and support of many." (四川省宝兴县灵关镇,受灾民众举着“我冷饿”的横幅,呼吸各方支持和关注。) The following day China's social media websites began censoring search results for "I'm cold, I'm hungry." See, http://blog.feichangdao.com/2013/04/2013-sichuan-earthquake-images-of.html.

9. Chai Jing's 2015 Anti-Pollution Video "Under the Dome"

China's state sponsored media acknowledged that China had severe pollution problems in 2015:

Air pollution has been a major concern for China throughout 2015, a year that marked a new phase in the country's air pollution control efforts, analysts said, after many cities were engulfed by hazardous smog and multiple measures were initiated against air pollution for the first time. After 2015 began with a controversial documentary about the hazards of smog, Under the Dome, the country has seen a rising public awareness of air pollution, as well as more measures from the government to curb the deterioration of air quality. Though Beijing's first-ever pollution red alert came at the end of the year, the country's battle against air pollution has just begun.

See: "Dark clouds still shroud blue skies," Global Times, December 29, 2015, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/961117.shtml

According to the state sponsored China Daily:

Chai Jing's one-year project, Under the Dome, marks a comeback for the former presenter and journalist with China Central Television following the birth of her child. It adds a sentimental touch to a matter of public interest with Chai not only an independent observer but also a concerned mother. . . . "I saw smog through my daughter's eyes," Chai said while presenting her film. She recounted how the little girl was confined indoors, patting the window to vent her frustration at being unable to play outside.

"Former TV anchor on crusade against pollution," China Daily, February 28, 2015, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-02/28/content_19681430.htm

When "Under the Dome" was released in early 2015, China's news media, video, and social media websites censored the video and information about the video. See:

10. Protests and Other Public Events

In China people are expected to know that information about public events, even reports of those events by news agencies, may be deemed by police, prosecutors, and judges to be state secrets. See, State v. Zheng Enchong, (2003) Hu No. 2 Intermediate Criminal No. 136 [郑恩宠刑事判决书, (2003)沪二中刑初字第136号]: "Zheng Enchong learned secrets from a police officer surnamed Xu that the Shanghai public security agency was dealing with emergencies arising from a sudden mass incident at the Shanghai Yimin Food Products Factory, he took notes, organized them, and on the morning of the 23rd, faxed a hand-written draft that included the aforementioned secrets from his residence at Puyuan Road to the organization Human Rights in China in New York."

Police in China are empowered by law to punish people without trial for sharing information and opinions about public events. The punishments can range from official reprimands to ordering people to delete information and software, to jailing them for up to 15 days. Some examples:

Even seemingly minor factual errors about traffic accidents can result in government sanctions. For example, in 2016 China's Internet regulator ordered a public WeChat account shut down because it posted an article with a headline that failed to make it clear that it was sheep, and not people, who died in a traffic accident. That same year a man was jailed for posting that seven people died in a car accident, when in fact only three people had died. See, https://blog.feichangdao.com/2016/02/government-shuts-down-wechat-account.html and http://blog.feichangdao.com/2014/07/internet-user-jailed-five-days-for.html.

Finally, China's news media, search engines, and social media websites censor information about protests, labor unrest, and other public incidents. For example:

Translation: Sun Daluo's Court Judgment for Sharing Books and Articles

The PRC government sentenced Sun Zhiming (孙志明, who wrote under the alias Sun Daluo (孙大骆)) to one year imprisonment for the crime of "di...