Tencent's Weixin Censors 1980's People's Daily Article on Cult of Personality

On September 3, 2023, an article titled "People's Daily: Exaggerating the Personal Role of Leaders to an Extreme Level will Lead to Superstitious Belief in the Individual" (人民日报：把领袖个人的作用夸大到极端的程度，就会出现对个人的迷信) was posted on the "The Reading Drawer" (抽屉读书) public Weixin account. It was censored within 24 hours and replaced with a notice saying: "This content cannot be viewed due to violations. Complaints were made by users and audited by the platform. This involves the use of words, pictures, videos, etc. that exaggerated, seduced and violated objective facts to maliciously incite, confuse and mislead users. Check the corresponding rules."

• Original URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/bS50iboCf-nLMkbZ8AmHPA
• Archives: https://archive.li/https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/bS50iboCf-nLMkbZ8AmHPA

I checked, and the Weixin article is a word-for-word copy paste of the referenced People's Daily article, which was published on Page 2 of the July 4, 1980 edition, according to the copy I found here: https://cn.govopendata.com/renminribao/1980/7/4/2/#542014 - with one exception, which I don't this is material:

• Weixin Article: 马克思主义者要承认个人权威，重视个人权威的，但是，我们首先要强调的还是集体的权威。
• govopendata: 马克思主义者是承认个人权威，重视个人权威的，但是，我们首先要强调的还是集体的权威。

The only other difference is the addition of the photo at the top of the Weixin article. Based on some online research, this is a photo of Nikita Khrushchev during his trip to the United States in 1959. 

Below are selected translations from the article (emphasis added by me).

Deification of, and superstitious belief in, the individual begins with exaggerating the role of the individual. Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" engaged in modern superstition, not only taking advantage of people's simple feelings, but also taking advantage of these loopholes in people's understanding.

A Profound Lesson in Personal Deification

The communist movement and our own experience show that when the role of individual leaders is exaggerated to an extreme level, superstitious belief in individuals will emerge.

For many years, we have been accustomed to using superstition to explain the history of our struggles. Now, as Marx said, we should "use history to explain superstition." (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 425) That is to say, we should take a look at history, how did a man become a "god"? How did people come to deify and superstitiously believe in individuals? In this way, the necessary lessons can be drawn. This is a rather complex and difficult task. Here are just a few examples, briefly.

. . . .

Our Party is organized according to the principle of democratic centralism. According to this principle, the Party line must be discussed and formulated by the Party's national congress or central authority. Although the Party's line is sometimes put forward by a certain person, once it is decided, it becomes the Party's line and cannot be attributed to an individual, it is called the line of so-and-so. Of course, when summing up historical experience, calling the opposing lines the lines of a certain person, and comparing and analyzing them will help distinguish right from wrong and educate the entire Party. But this is a special situation. From the perspective of organizational principles, within the Party, all Party members must implement the Party's line, rather than the entire Party following the line of a certain individual.

However, for a period of time, people have often attributed the Party's line to individuals, and also promoted all the opinions and propositions of individual leaders as lines, or believed that they have the same authority as the Party's line, and the whole Party must unconditionally implement it. In this way, in the life of the Party, in fact, some abnormal practices gradually took shape: obeying the Party's leadership means listening to a certain person, implementing the Party's line means doing what a certain person says, and thinking that as long as you act "in accordance with every sentence," you will be invincible. This actually regards the individual as a sacred authority over the entire Party.

. . . .

We must be highly conscious and take various measures to prevent the situation where the top leaders look down at the masses from above, while the masses can only squint and look up at the leader from below, so as to prevent the leader from becoming a figure that ordinary people cannot approach. The guidelines for political life within the Party passed by the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee have made a series of specific regulations to prevent leaders from becoming special in their political life and from praising leaders without principle. This is undoubtedly necessary. However, in order to achieve what Lenin said, to make the leaders and the class, and the leaders and the masses form a whole, we still need to make efforts in many aspects and have a series of effective methods. For example, restore the system that our Party advocates that senior leading cadres must spend a certain amount of time at the grassroots level in a year; establish a system for leaders to communicate directly with the people; put senior leaders in fixed electoral districts to maintain regular contact with voters and accept voter supervision; cancel all kinds of unreasonable regulations that completely separate senior leaders from ordinary cadres and the masses in daily life (such as housing, transportation, shopping, entertainment, etc.); and we must use newspapers and radio to exert the supervisory power of public opinion, etc. In short, we should continue to adhere to the methods that have worked well in the past, and at the same time, we should continue to adopt some new methods based on new situations. 

. . . .

To gather the experience and opinions of the broad masses and the entire Party and form correct leadership ideas and opinions, it is necessary to adopt democratic centralism and collective research and discussion. The view that "the first secretary has absolute truth, the second secretary has relative truth, and the others have no truth" is not in line with the facts.

. . . .

Second, we must treat the right of one vote correctly. In the leadership team, the top leader has more responsibilities but no greater power. He has only one vote in deciding major issues, while other members have the same vote. Why do some leadership groups form a "one-man-talk" situation? The first is that the top leader lacks a democratic style and engages in personal arbitrariness. At the same time, it is also an important reason why each leading member cannot exercise his right to vote seriously and responsibly. If every leading member can responsibly exercise his right to one vote, especially when some people put forward wrong propositions, everyone can stick to the principles and not support or veto them, then can "one word" be achieved? Can personal arbitrariness prevail unimpeded? Can those wrong and confusing decisions be made easily? Therefore, every leading member must exercise his right to vote with the utmost solemnity when deciding major issues.

. . . .

Marxists must recognize and value individual authority, but the first thing we must emphasize is collective authority. Only when personal authority is combined with collective authority can it play its role better.

神化个人、迷信个人，是从夸大个人的作用开始的。林彪、“四人帮”大搞现代迷信，除了利用人们的朴素感情外，也钻了人们在认识上的这些空子。

神化个人的深刻教训

共产主义运动和我们自己的经验说明，把领袖个人的作用夸大到极端的程度，就会出现对个人的迷信。

多年来，习惯于用迷信来说明我们的斗争历史，现在，应该象马克思说的那样，“用历史来说明迷信”。（《马克思恩格斯全集》第１卷第４２５页）这就是说，应当从历史上看一看，人是怎样成为“神”的？人们是怎样神化个人、迷信个人的？这样，才能得出必要的经验教训。这是一项相当复杂而艰巨的任务。这里仅举几个例子，简略地说一下。
. . . .
我们的党是按照民主集中制的原则组织起来的。根据这个原则，党的路线必须由党的全国代表大会或中央权力机构讨论制定。党的路线尽管有时是由某个人提出来的，但一经作出决定，就成了党的路线，而不能归之于个人，称为某某人的路线了。当然，在总结历史经验时，把对立的路线分别称之为某某人的路线，加以对比分析，这样做，有利于分清是非，教育全党。但这是一种特殊的情况，从组织原则说，在党内，所有党员必须执行党的路线，而不是全党执行某一个人的路线。

但是，一个时期以来，人们却常常把党的路线归之于个人，而且，又把领袖个人的一切意见主张都上升为路线，或认为具有党的路线那样的权威性，全党必须无条件地执行。这样，在党的生活中，实际上就逐渐形成了某些不正常的准则：服从党的领导就是听某一个人的话，执行党的路线就是照某一个人说的去干，而且认为，只要“句句照办”，就能无往而不胜。这实际上是把个人看成为凌驾于全党之上的神圣权威了。
. . . .
我们要以高度的自觉，采取各种措施，防止出现领导上层从上面向下看群众，而人民群众只能眯着眼睛从下面向上望领袖的状况，防止领袖成为普通群众无法接近的人物。党的五中全会通过的党内政治生活准则，对防止领导人政治上生活上的特殊化，防止对领导人无原则的歌功颂德，已经作了一系列具体的规定。这无疑是很必要的。但是，要做到列宁讲的，使领袖与阶级、领袖与群众结成一个整体，则还要作多方面的努力，还要有一系列有效的办法。比如，恢复我们党提倡的高级领导干部一年要有一定时间下基层的制度；建立领导者与人民群众直接对话的制度；把高级领导人放到固定选区保持与选民的经常联系并接受选民监督；取消在日常生活中（如住房、坐车、购物、娱乐等）把高级领导人与一般干部和群众完全分开的种种不合理规定；各种代表大会作为权力机构，要切实加强对领导工作人员的监督，并要利用报纸、广播，发挥舆论的监督力量，等等。总之，凡是过去行之有效的办法应当继续坚持，同时，要根据新的情况，不断采取一些新的办法。
. . . .
要把广大群众和全党的经验、意见集中起来，形成正确的领导思想和领导意见，就必须通过民主集中制，通过集体研究讨论。那种“第一书记有绝对真理，第二书记有相对真理，其他人没有真理”的看法，是不符合事实的。
. . . .
第二，要正确对待一票的权利。在领导班子中，第一把手负有更多的责任，但并没有更大的权力，在决定重大问题时，他只有一票的权利，而其他成员也有同样一票的权利。为什么有的领导班子形成“一言堂”的局面呢？首先是第一把手缺乏民主作风，搞个人专断。同时，各个领导成员不能严肃负责地行使自己一票的权利，也是一个重要原因。如果每一个领导成员都能负责地行使自己一票的权利，特别是在某些人提出错误的主张时，大家都能坚持原则，不予支持，或给以否决，“一言堂”能搞得起来吗？个人专断能畅行无阻吗？那些错误的、颠倒是非的决定，能够轻而易举地作出来吗？因此，每一个领导成员，在决定重大问题时，一定要以极其郑重的态度行使自己一票的权利。
. . . .

马克思主义者要承认个人权威，重视个人权威的，但是，我们首先要强调的还是集体的权威。个人权威只有与集体权威相结合，才能更好地发挥其作用。

Science with PRC Characteristics: CAS Academics Must "Toe Party Line"

 On September 6, 2023, the state sponsored media outlet Caixin published an article titled "China’s Top Academics Told to Toe Party Line With Public Statements." https://www.caixinglobal.com/2023-09-06/chinas-top-academics-told-to-toe-party-line-with-public-statements-102101001.html

Some excerpts:

China’s top science academy has updated its code of conduct with new rules that require members ensure their public statements are “in line with the general policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” and prohibit openly expressing academic views unrelated to their field of expertise.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) code of conduct, which consists of 33 articles in six chapters, is an update of a version released nine years ago.
. . . .
Compared to the 2014 version, the latest code adds a chapter that specifies what CAS scientists are prohibited from doing.

Specifically, the new version the Chinese Academy of Sciences Code of Conduct (中国科学院院士行为规范（试行）) contains the following provisions:

Article 2: Abide by the Constitution, laws and regulations, improve political standing, enhance awareness of responsibility, respect moral integrity, model love of the Party and love of country, and be an example for scientific researchers.

Article 3: Set an example of cherishing the fatherland and serving the people. To improve our country's independent innovation capabilities, enhance our country's comprehensive national strength, promote our country's scientific and technological progress, economic development, ecological protection, and improvement of people's livelihood, and serve national security and national decision-making.

Article 19 Consciously accept social supervision and correctly address doubts and criticisms. When making public statements, be consistent with the major policies of the Party Central Committee.

第二条 遵守宪法和法律法规，提高政治站位，增强责任意识，尊崇道德操守，做爱党爱国的模范和科研人员的榜样。

第三条 做胸怀祖国、服务人民的表率。为提高我国自主创新能力，增强我国综合国力，推动我国科技进步、经济发展、生态保护、民生改善，服务国家安全和国家决策作出贡献。

第十九条  按规定出席评审会议，超脱部门、单位和学科的利益，郑重负责地履行选举权利。关注新兴和交叉学科的发展，注意学科平衡。

The previous version of the Code of Conduct (available here: http://www.jskx.org.cn/web/artlist/777928) did not contain any mention of the terms "Party" (党), "fatherland" (祖国), "national security" (国家安全) or "love the country" (爱国).

Academics Criticise Proposed Public Security Administrative Punishments Law Revisions

 As noted previously on this blog, in early Septmber 2023, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress solicited public comment on proposed revisions to the Public Security Administrative Punishments Law through September 30, 2023. One of the most drastic proposals was the addition of a new Article 34:

Anyone who commits any of the following acts shall be detained for not less than five days but not more than ten days, or fined not less than 1,000 yuan but not more than 3,000 yuan; if the circumstances are relatively serious, they shall be detained for not less than ten days but not more than fifteen days, and may also be fined not more than 5,000 yuan:

(1) Engaging in activities in public venues that damage the environment and atmosphere of commemorating heroes and martyrs;

(2) Wearing or adorning, or forcing others to wear or adorn, clothing or symbols in public venues that are detrimental to the spirit of the Chinese nation or hurt the feelings of the Chinese nation;

(3) Producing, spreading, advocating, or disseminating articles or remarks that are detrimental to the spirit of the Chinese nation or hurt the feelings of the Chinese nation;

(4) Blaspheming or repudiating the deeds and spirit of heroes and martyrs, advocating or beautifying aggressive wars and acts of aggression, disturbing the peace, and disrupting public order;

(5) Insulting, defaming, or otherwise infringing on the names, likenesses, reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs, harming the public interest of society;

(6) Occupying, destroying, or defacing memorial facilities for heroes and martyrs.

On September 6, several PRC academics published statements criticizing Article 34.

Tong Zhiwei (童之伟), Professor of Constitutional Law, East China University of Political Science and Law

https://weibo.com/1837869620/Ni1q3pSIU

It is recommended that paragraphs 2-3 of Article 34 of the "Public Security Management Punishment Law" (revised draft) not be reviewed for the time being. Who determines what is the "spirit of the Chinese nation" and what procedures are followed? Who determines what are the "feelings of the Chinese nation" and what procedures are followed to recognize and determine it? These are huge problems that are almost impossible to implement in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. If the National People's Congress Standing Committee adopts this article according to the current draft, the practical consequence of its enforcement and adjudication will inevitably be the arrest and conviction of people in accordance with the will of senior officers, which will lead to untold troubles. The law is something that regulates human behavior, and scientific legislation requires legislators to always avoid making regulations on matters of "spirit" and "feelings."

建议暂不审议《治安管理处罚法》（修订草案）第34条第2-3款。“中华民族精神”由谁确认，按什么程序确认？“中华民族感情”由谁体认，按什么程序体认和确定？这都是极大的、几乎无法循法治原则操作的问题。若全国人大常委会按现在的草案通过该条，执法司法上必造成循长官意志抓人、定罪的实际后果，会贻害无穷。法律是调整人的行为的，科学立法要求立法者永远避免就“精神”和“感情”问题做规定。

 

Lao Dongyan (劳东燕), Professor of Criminal Law, Tsinghua University

https://weibo.com/7740539018/Ni1gijcyR 

A few days ago, I saw the content stipulated in Article 34 of the "Public Security Management Punishments Law (Revised Draft)". To be honest, I couldn't believe it. Today I went to the National People's Congress website to check the content of the draft, and I found out that it was indeed true. The draft is currently in the stage of soliciting opinions, and comments can be submitted on the "Draft Law Soliciting Opinions" column of the People's Congress website (www.npc.gov.cn/flcaw/).

Regarding the provisions of Items 2-3 of Article 34, I hold an objection and suggest that they be deleted. The main reasons are:

First, "harming the spirit of the Chinese nation and hurting the feelings of the Chinese nation" is a concept with extremely vague connotations. Different people will have completely different understandings and grasps. If it is used as a legal penalty standard, the problem will be the penalty standard will inevitably be too vague, which can easily lead to arbitrary expansion of the scope of administrative penalties.

Second, due to the ambiguity of punishment standards, it will inevitably lead to selective enforcement of administrative power, which is prone to abuse of power, thus creating a new space for the breeding of corruption, and may intensify conflicts between the police and the public, bringing new risks to social stability.

Third, state power will directly interfere in area of daily clothing of individual citizens, which raises  the obvious suspicion that there will be excessive intervention. National spirit and national feelings are matters at the cultural and spiritual level. The State can advocate them, but they should not be promoted through legal coercion.

Fourth, such legislative provisions may stimulate the wanton spread of populism or extreme nationalism, further deteriorate the public opinion environment in the public sphere, and unduly suppress the freedom of individuals to dress and speak in their daily lives. At the same time, it may also intensify antagonism with some countries, leading to diplomatic passivity.

些天就看到《治安管理处罚法（修订草案）》第34条规定的内容。老实说，我有些不敢相信，今天特地到中国人大网上查了草案的内容，才知道确实是真的。草案目前正处于征求意见阶段，可以在人大网“法律草案征求意见”栏提意见（www.npc.gov.cn/flcaw/）。

对于第34条第2-3项的规定，我持反对意见，建议删除为妥。主要理由是：

其一，“有损中华民族精神、伤害中华民族感情”是内涵极为模糊的概念，不同的人会有完全相异的理解与把握，将其作为法律上的处罚标准，必然面临处罚标准过于模糊的问题，容易造成任意扩张行政处罚的范围。

其二，由于处罚标准模糊，势必导致行政权力的选择性执法，容易出现滥权现象，从而为腐败的滋生创设新的空间，并且可能激化警民矛盾，给社会稳定带来新的风险。

其三，国家权力直接干预公民个人的日常穿着领域，明显有过度干预之嫌。民族精神与民族感情属于文化精神层面的事务，国家可以进行倡导，但不应通过法律强制的方式来推行。

其四，这样的立法规定可能会刺激民粹主义或极端民族主义情绪的肆意蔓延，进一步恶化公共领域的舆论环境，不当压制个人在日常穿衣与言论的自由空间。同时，也可能加剧与一些国家的对立情绪，导致外交上的被动。

Zhao Hong (赵宏), Professor at China University of Political Science and Law

https://i.ifeng.com/c/8SrCr8t1itK

An expansion of the scope of punishable offenses also means an expansion of the authority of the public security agencies. The law must establish corresponding restraint mechanisms for this expansion of authority, otherwise the crackdown on and suppression of emerging illegal activities is likely to breed unconstrained and uncontrolled powers.

The modern rule of law has never advocated a doctrine of creating felonies in the pursuit order and unity through heavy punishment. On the contrary, it is always vigilant against the expansion of state power. Expanding the scope of punishable offenses under the Public Security Administration Punishments Law, the most punitive departmental law in the administrative field, must be approached with caution. It is necessary to clearly delineate the areas that require the intervention of the State's power to punish, and to avoid blurring the boundaries between law and morality.
. . . .
The newly added Article 34 inevitably brings to mind the precedent of a girl in Suzhou last year who accused of disturbing the peace by wearing a kimono. In that case, the individual was reprimanded by the police for wearing a kimono and taking photos in a Japanese-style street in Suzhou. After the individual expressed doubts, the police took her to the police station for investigation on suspicion of disturbing the peace. In the end, the party involved was not punished, but after the case was exposed it still had a relatively adverse social impact. Many Internet users commented that if taking pictures in a kimono can be understood as something damaging to the national spirit that should be punished by the police, then eating Japanese food, watching anime, or even learning the Japanese language will most likely be considered to offend national sentiments. If public officials can expand the interpretation and application of laws at will based on their personal preferences and ideas and creeds, then we are not far away from the situation where "if the authorities want to punish someone, they can always find grounds to frame them."

扩大处罚圈同样意味着公安机关权限的扩张，对这种权限的扩张，法律上必须配置以相应的约束机制，否则对新兴违法行为的打击和压制很有可能滋生出不受约束和控制的权力。

现代法治从来不倡导借由重罚重刑来追求秩序统一的重刑主义，相反它对国家权力的扩张时刻保持警醒。《治安管理处罚法》作为行政领域惩戒力度最重的部门法规范，在扩大处罚圈时必须慎之又慎，既要清晰地划定需要国家惩罚权介入的领域，也要避免法律与道德边界的消弭。
. . . .
新增的第34条不免让人联想到去年苏州女生穿和服被寻衅滋事的旧案。在该案中，当事人因在苏州日式风情街穿和服拍照遭到警察训斥，在当事人表示质疑后，警察以涉嫌寻衅滋事为由将其带至派出所调查。尽管当事人最终并未被处罚，但案件曝光后仍造成了较为恶劣的社会影响。许多网友评价，如果穿和服拍照都可以被理解为有损民族精神，就应被治安处罚，那么吃日料、看动漫，甚至是学日文，都极有可能会被认为是冒犯民族感情；如果公职人员可以凭个人偏好和观念信条，随意扩张解释和适用法律，那么我们距离“欲加之罪、何患无辞”也就不远了。

 

Proposed Revisions to the Public Security Administrative Punishments Law and Their Impact on Freedom of Speech

Based on my research in compiling "State Prosecutions of Speech in the People's Republic of China" (https://ssrn.com/abstract=4168412), three of the six offenses commonly employed by the PRC government to prosecute speech appear in the Public Security Administrative Punishments Law (治安管理处罚法). They are:

Article 25 (Disrupting Public Order by Disseminating Rumors). Example: In 2015, a court held the police did not violate Zhang Guanghong's rights when they jailed him for seven days and confiscated his computer on the grounds that he "used his own Sina Weibo to spread rumors and posts about the 'Five Heroes of Wolf Tooth Mountain' and distorted the image of those revolutionary martyrs." See "State Prosecutions," pp. 540-546.

Article 26 (Other Acts Disturbing the Peace). Example: In 2018, court found that police did not violate Feng Zhouguan's rights by subjecting him to five days administrative detention for referring to Xi Jinping as "fat pig," "steamed bun," and "spendthrift" in WeChat posts. The court rejected Feng's claim that "If the country's leader or his appointed attorneys want to play at litigation with [Feng] then [the police] should maintain a neutral stance because the [police] are agents of the country's judiciary." See "State Prosecutions," pp. 426-435.

Article 42 (Flagrantly Insulting or Concocting Facts to Defame Another Party). Example: In 2014, a court found that police did not violate Cheng Huaishan's rights when they subjected him to administrative detention for a single QQ post that the police decided "flagrantly humiliated leaders of the Party and the State" including Xi Jinping and other members of the Politburo Standing Committee. The court acknowledged that Cheng's post did not explicitly name any State leader, but "nevertheless included content that was clearly insulting and defamatory, and its target was both specific and unique, and based on the timing of the post and the related content, it was entirely obvious who it was about." See "State Prosecutions," pp. 416-420.

The Public Security Administrative Punishments Law is also used to punish individuals for using VPNs to access websites that the PRC government blocks using the Great Firewall. For examples, see "State Prosecutions," Chapter 16, pp. 641-643.

On September 1, 2023, the NPC Observer published an article (https://npcobserver.com/2023/09/01/china-npc-consultation-public-security-administration-company-vat-education-law/) stating that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) is soliciting public comment on proposed revisions to the Public Security Administrative Punishments Law through September 30, 2023. That announcement included a link to a PDF outlining the proposed revisions: https://npcobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Public-Security-Administrative-Punishments-Law-Draft-Revision.pdf.

In the table below I've pulled out the provisions that could potentially be used to prosecute speech related activities, along with English translations. Some initial impressions:

There are no significant changes to Articles 25, 26, and 42.

The draft adds new language stating explicitly that "The comprehensive management of social security adheres to the leadership of the Communist Party of China."

The draft adds this new language to Article 27 (now Article 30): "Producing, spreading, or possessing for the purpose of spreading items, information, and materials that promote cults and sects." This will no doubt be used to punish Falun Gong practitioners and house church members. For an example of how these acts have been punished under Criminal Law, see the case of Geng Doe, who in 2020 was found guilty of "Using a cult to undermine law enforcement" on the grounds that she invited three other people to come to her home to "practice Falun Gong and share their knowledge of Falun Gong with one another." "State Prosecutions," Chapter 7, pp. 252-255.

The draft adds an entirely new provision devoted to offenses against the image of the State, Article 34. Some of the draft language closely mirrors the Protection of Heroes and Martyrs Law (英雄烈士保护法), for example "Engaging in activities in public venues that damage the environment and atmosphere of commemorating heroes and martyrs," and "Insulting, defaming, or otherwise infringing on the names, likenesses, reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs, harming the public interest of society." The remainder of Article 30, however, creates new offenses which will allow to the government to punish a broad range of pure speech conduct simply on the grounds that someone might find it offensive:

• Clause (2) makes it illegal to wear or adorn clothing or symbols in public venues that "harm the spirit of the Chinese nation or hurt the feelings of the Chinese nation." It is easy to see how this provision could be used by police in the PRC to jail individuals who engage in protest activities outside of the PRC who then return to the PRC.
• Clause (3) makes it illegal to produce, advocate, or publish any remarks that are "detrimental to the spirit of the Chinese nation or hurt the feelings of the Chinese nation." It is easy to see how this provision could be used by police in the PRC to jail individuals who publish anything critical of the Communist Party of China or its leaders outside of the PRC who then return to the PRC.
• Clause (4) makes it illegal to advocate or beautify "aggressive wars and acts of aggression." It seems unlikely that this will be used by police to punish state run media when they advocate aggression against Taiwan (see, e.g., "PLA Conducts Mock Strikes on Taiwan Island on 2nd Day of Encirclement Drills" https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202304/1288744.shtml). But it is easy to see how this provision could be used by police in the PRC to jail individuals who express support for freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

ORIGINAL	REVISED	ENGLISH TRANSLATION
第六条 各级人民政府应当加强社会治安综合治理,采取有效措施,化解社会矛盾,增进社会和谐,维护社会稳定.	第二条 社会治安综合治理工作坚持中国共产党领导. 各级人民政府应当加强社会治安综合治理,采取有效措施,化解社会矛盾,增进社会和谐,维护社会稳定. 县级以上人民政府有关部门应当在各自职责范围内,做好社会治安综合治理相关工作.	Article 62 The comprehensive management of social security adheres to the leadership of the Communist Party of China. People's governments at all levels shall strengthen comprehensive management of social security and take effective measures to resolve social conflicts, enhance social harmony, and maintain social stability. Relevant departments of the people's governments at or above the county level shall carry out work related to the comprehensive management of social security within the scope of their respective responsibilities.
第二十五条 有下列行为之一的,处五日以上十日以下拘留,可以并处五百元以下罚款;情节较轻的,处五日以下拘留或者五百元以下罚款: (一)散布谣言,谎报险情、疫情、警情或者以其他方法故意扰乱公共秩序的; (二)投放虚假的爆炸性、毒害性、放射性、腐蚀性物质或者传染病病原体等危险物质扰乱公共秩序的; (三)扬言实施放火、爆炸、投放危险物质扰乱公共秩序的.	第二十八条 有下列行为之一的,处五日以上十日以下拘留,可以并处一千元以下罚款;情节较轻的,处五日以下拘留或者一千元以下罚款: (一)散布谣言,谎报险情、疫情、警情或者以其他方法故意扰乱公共秩序的; (二)投放虚假的爆炸性、毒害性、放射性、腐蚀性物质或者传染病病原体等危险物质扰乱公共秩序的; (三)扬言实施放火、爆炸、投放危险物质等行为扰乱公共秩序的.	Article 258. A person who commits one of the following acts shall be detained for not less than 5 days but not more than 10 days and may, in addition, be fined not more than 500 yuan 1,000 yuan; and if the circumstances are relatively minor, he shall be detained for not more than 5 days or be fined not more than 500 yuan 1,000 yuan: (1) intentionally disturbing public order by spreading rumors, making false reports of dangerous situations and epidemic situations or raising false alarms or by other means; (2) disturbing public order by putting in fake hazardous substances such as explosive, toxic, radioactive and corrosive substances or pathogens of infectious diseases; or (3) disturbing public order by actions such as threatening to set fire, set off explosions, or put in hazardous substances.
第二十六条 有下列行为之一的,处五日以上十日以下拘留,可以并处五百元以下罚款;情节较重的,处十日以上十五日以下拘留,可以并处一千元以下罚款: (一)结伙斗殴的; (二)追逐、拦截他人的; (三)强拿硬要或者任意损毁、占用公私财物的; (四)其他寻衅滋事行为.	第二十九条 有下列行为之一的,处五日以上十日以下拘留,可以并处一千元以下罚款;情节较重的,处十日以上十五日以下拘留,可以并处二千元以下罚款: (一)结伙斗殴的; (二)追逐、拦截他人的; (三)强拿硬要或者任意损毁、占用公私财物的; (四)其他寻衅滋事行为.	Article 269. A person who commits one of the following acts shall be detained for not less than 5 days but not more than 10 days and may, in addition, be fined not more than 500 yuan 1,000 yuan; and if the circumstances are relatively serious, he shall be detained for not less 10 than days but not more than 15 days and may, in addition, be fined not more than 1,000 yuan 2,000 yuan: (1) gang-fighting; (2) chasing or intercepting another person; (3) forcibly taking and obstinately seizing, or willfully damaging and occupying public or private property; or (4) other provocative acts.
	第三十条 (三)制作、传播、为传播而持有宣扬邪教、会道门内容的物品、信息、资料的. 明知他人从事前款活动,为其提供条件的,依照前款的规定处罚.	Article 2730 (3) Producing, spreading, or possessing for the purpose of spreading items, information, and materials that promote cults and sects. Whoever knowingly provides the conditions for others to engage in the activities in the preceding paragraph shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
	第三十四条 有下列行为之一的,处五日以上十日以下拘留或者一千元以上三千元以下罚款;情节较重的,处十日以上十五日以下拘留,可以并处五千元以下罚款: (一)在公共场所从事有损纪念英雄烈士环境和氛围的活动的; (二)在公共场所或者强制他人在公共场所穿着、佩戴有损中华民族精神、伤害中华民族感情的服饰、标志的; (三)制作、传播、宣扬、散布有损中华民族精神、伤害中华民族感情的物品或者言论的; (四)亵渎、否定英雄烈士事迹和精神,宣扬、美化侵略战争和侵略行为,寻衅滋事,扰乱公共秩序的; (五)以侮辱、诽谤或者其他方式侵害英雄烈士的姓名、肖像、名誉、荣誉,损害社会公共利益的; (六)侵占、破坏、污损英雄烈士纪念设施的.	Article 34 Anyone who commits any of the following acts shall be detained for not less than five days but not more than ten days, or fined not less than 1,000 yuan but not more than 3,000 yuan; if the circumstances are relatively serious, they shall be detained for not less than ten days but not more than fifteen days, and may also be fined not more than 5,000 yuan: (1) Engaging in activities in public venues that damage the environment and atmosphere of commemorating heroes and martyrs; (2) Wearing or adorning, or forcing others to wear or adorn, clothing or symbols in public venues that are detrimental to the spirit of the Chinese nation or hurt the feelings of the Chinese nation; (3) Producing, spreading, advocating, or disseminating articles or remarks that are detrimental to the spirit of the Chinese nation or hurt the feelings of the Chinese nation; (4) Blaspheming or repudiating the deeds and spirit of heroes and martyrs, advocating or beautifying aggressive wars and acts of aggression, disturbing the peace, and disrupting public order; (5) Insulting, defaming, or otherwise infringing on the names, likenesses, reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs, harming the public interest of society; (6) Occupying, destroying, or defacing memorial facilities for heroes and martyrs.